Changing patterns of government narratives on conflict in Ethiopia

July 2024

July at a Glance

Vital Trends

In July, ACLED records 212 political violence events and 694 reported fatalities in Ethiopia.
Battles and violence against civilians were the two most common events in July, with 146 and 57 incidents, respectively. Most of these events were linked with the ongoing conflict between government and insurgent forces in the Amhara and Oromia regions.
In July, ACLED records the most political violence — 128 events and 488 reported fatalities — in Amhara region, followed by Oromia region, with 74 events and 184 reported fatalities.

Infographic - Ethiopia monthly update - July 2024

Changing patterns of government narratives on conflict in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s media environment is a highly polarized space, with conflicting narratives about nearly every instance of political violence that occurs in the country. Efforts by the government and armed actors within the country to obscure information, a proliferation of biased reports, and difficulty in covering events that occur in areas with little infrastructure all make Ethiopia’s media landscape an extremely difficult operating environment for research. Despite these challenges, methodologically tracking even biased sources can produce valuable insights about the nature of political violence in Ethiopia and inform policymakers of vital trends.

Of particular interest in Ethiopia are government narratives concerning safety and security in the country. Throughout the first part of the northern Ethiopia conflict — which took place from 3 November 2020 to 27 June 2021 — government media understated the seriousness of the instability in the country in order to present a more stable environment, appeal to international investors, and appease a domestic audience.¹ Information about armed clashes occurring in the country — be it in Tigray or Oromia regions — was obscured and the government gave out little information about the conflict. Human rights organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch confirmed accounts of high-fatality civilian targeting incidents amid a media blackout without any input from the federal government’s media outlets.² Even accounts of government victories were rare. As the northern Ethiopia conflict moved into Amhara region, government-based reporting was largely accounted for by the Amhara regional government, again with little input from the federal government. In 2024, this trend appears to have reversed, as government reports and media are the sole sources for a significant portion (28%) of all political violence events in the ACLED database, compared to 1% in 2023.

Government-based media reports: 2024

Since the beginning of 2024, government media has uniquely reported 369 political disorder events that resulted in an estimated 3,020 reported fatalities. From these events, we can identify two focus areas for government reports: accounts of operations undertaken by one of the various security agencies in the country, most often the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), and arrests, including seizures of weapons and the arrests of individuals associated with armed groups (see graph below). Unsurprisingly, federal government reporting on civilian targeting by non-government forces, protests, or riot events is nonexistent, while Amhara regional outlets often report on pro-Amhara protests in disputed territories in Tigray region.

Disorder in Ethiopia - January - July 2024 - Bar Graph

Given the focus of government reports on armed interactions, it can be assumed that the government is trying to control the narrative about violence occurring in areas with active conflict and emphasize the actions federal forces are taking to manage the country’s security challenges.

Aside from distinct biases in the coverage of different forms of violence, government reports also display clear geographic preferences. In 2024, the government reports security forces engaging in the most armed clashes in Amhara region’s West Gojam zone (clashes involving the ENDF and Fano militias), followed by East Gojam zone in the same region. Government reporting also indicates a high number of operations against the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane — by federal and Oromia regional state forces in East Wollega and Horo Guduru Wollega zones, Oromia region.

Government and non-government reporting by media houses not owned by the government indicate that, thus far, West Gojam zone in Amhara region has been the most violent zone in the country in 2024. Reports by non-government media, in contrast to government reports, focus on clashes in North Shewa and North Wello zones in Amhara region, North Shewa zone in Oromia region, and Southern Tigray zone in Tigray region.

Areas where government reports do not focus but where other sources report high rates of political violence are areas where the context of conflict is complicated and a variety of armed actors operate. For example, in North Shewa zone of Oromia region, reports by non-government media houses in July indicated clashes between federal security forces and the OLA/OLF-Shane. They also included battles between Fano militias and Oromia regional forces, as well as violence against civilians by myriad armed groups associated with anti-government groups. Likewise, government reporting did not cover the clashes that took place in the contested territory of Southern Tigray zone, which threatened the Pretoria agreement.

Government messaging: Decoding media reports

The government’s apparent shift toward increased reporting on political violence comes at a time of persistent challenges to the country’s stability. Ethiopians have taken notice of increasing lawlessness throughout the country and have expressed frustration over the government’s inability to stem the rise in insecurity.³ The month of July 2024 was no exception. Following the kidnapping of hundreds of students by suspected OLA/OLF-Shane militants, government officials’ claims that they had been released proved inconsistent with the victims’ families insistence that their relatives remained in the kidnappers’ custody.⁴ Kidnappings have become commonplace, with perpetrators even targeting wealthy individuals in Addis Ababa.⁵ At the same time, government and non-government forces, like Fano militias and OLA/OLF-Shane, were responsible for the deaths of an estimated 191 civilians in Amhara and Oromia regions in July. Sudanese refugees fleeing violence in their home country have found the lack of security in Ethiopia to be unbearable. In addition, Ethiopia’s economy has been battered by reports of insecurity, frightened foreign investors, and disruption to the availability of foreign currency.⁶

Without access to insider information concerning government media strategies, it is impossible to pinpoint reasons for this change in government media strategy. Certainly, given the situation in the country today, there is some incentive for the government to attempt to control the narrative around conflict reporting and take credit for the actions federal forces take against perpetrators of violence. Acknowledgment by the government that regular battles are being fought in multiple locations in the country on a weekly basis paints a bleak picture of the situation in the country and the government’s ability to provide security for its population.⁷ While insurgencies have challenged the government for many years, deepening insecurity stemming from criminal activity and armed anti-government political actors has reached a tipping point. To maintain its support bases, the government needs to push information that indicates it is at least attempting to stem the rising tide of lawlessness.

What is important is this: The government is reporting on conflicts in the country and is doing so on a regular basis, often including extravagant claims of large fatality counts among insurgents.⁸ In its reporting the government includes details on its operations that, even as they promote the image of a capable national defense force, also reveal the very serious nature of the ongoing insurgencies in both Amhara and Oromia regions. This marks a significant change from the past, where conflict was intentionally obscured or downplayed.