In Amhara, over 7 million people are exposed to political violence
August 2024

August at a glance

Vital Trends

In August, ACLED records 227 political violence events and 945 reported fatalities in Ethiopia.
Battles and violence against civilians were the two most common events in August, with 163 and 57 incidents, respectively. Most of these events were linked with the ongoing conflict between government and insurgent forces in the Amhara and Oromia regions.
In August, ACLED records the most political violence — 141 events and 637 reported fatalities — in Amhara region, followed by Oromia region, with 69 events and 270 reported fatalities.

Overview of ethiopia political violence events for August 2024

In Amhara, over 7 million people are exposed to political violence

Since April 2023, Fano militias have been fighting against the government, engulfing Amhara region in varying degrees of unrest. August marks one year since the government declared a state of emergency — which ended on 4 June — to curb the insecurity in the region. Nevertheless, battles between the warring parties have dominated in some areas. Additionally, general insecurity and kidnapping have been pervasive throughout the rest of the region, affecting the population even in areas where battles are not occurring.

Like in Oromia region, where the government is fighting the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane — a lack of alignment and unity among the armed factions has contributed to the spread of more general insecurity in Amhara region.

Insecurity in Amhara region: Violence targeting civilians

Incidents of violence targeting civilians in Amhara region have risen since the beginning of the Fano insurgency in April of 2023, escalating significantly in September 2023 and peaking in July 2024 (see graph below). Most of the time, civilian targeting follows other violence trends closely — as battles with Fano militias have risen, so have civilian casualties. For example, on 24 June 2024, the Ethiopian National Defense Force attacked civilians in Adete town in North Gojam zone following a clash with a Fano militia. Government forces reportedly killed 11 people they accused of providing information for Fano.

Chart showing civilian targeting in Amhara region, January 2023-August 2024

Violence targeting civilians fell in August after peaking in July, yet remained at high levels, with 19 events and 73 estimated fatalities, and was perpetrated by a number of actors. Fano militias targeted government-affiliated individuals, government forces were accused of targeting civilians suspected of being Fano supporters, and unidentified armed gunmen attacked civilians — including refugees and humanitarian workers. General insecurity has increased significantly during the Fano insurgency, and a number of kidnapping for ransom cases were reported in August.¹ On 3 September, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said it had found that a breakdown of security and governance structures as a result of prolonged conflicts in Amhara and Oromia regions had led to attacks targeting civilians, both by parties to the conflict and by criminal elements.² Since 1 April 2023, civilian targeting incidents have occurred most frequently in West Gojam, North Shewa, and North Wello zones. Violence targeting civilians is not limited to Ethiopian citizens. ACLED records 11 attacks targeting Sudanese refugees since April 2023, a problem that has continued to worsen despite efforts by the Ethiopian government and the United Nations to move refugees to safer locations. Attacks, which include armed robberies and abductions, have sparked refugee protests and attempts to leave camps.

ACLED’s Conflict Exposure Calculator estimates that over 7 million people have been exposed to organized political violence events in Amhara region since 1 April 2023. Only Oromia region records a similar civilian conflict exposure level during the same period. In addition to facing direct civilian targeting, a large percentage of Amhara region’s population has been exposed to conflict in other ways. Residents of the region report shortages and price increases in medicine and basic supplies, as well as thousands of shuttered schools.³

Fano Factions: pointing fingers and parallels to Oromia region

Since the beginning, Fano militias have faced many hurdles in attempting to unify, with factions separated by political ideology, religion, and birthplace. This fractured organization has led, arguably, to the rise in Fano-associated groups that engage in more criminal activity and civilian targeting. Without a strong central command for Fano and a weak government security apparatus, self-proclaimed or community-labeled Fano-affiliate youth groups easily operate under the popularity of the Fano cause and engage in kidnapping for ransom, civilian targeting, and general criminal behavior. Similarly to groups affiliated with the OLA/OLF-Shane in Oromia region, a lack of rigid structure at the lower levels of the group and lack of central control and oversight has led to a proliferation of new groups that engage in criminal activity and target civilian victims.

As with the OLA/OLF-Shane in Oromia region, Fano representatives insist that the insecurity is the government’s fault, often blaming shadowy government-associated militias.⁴ For example, the kidnapping and subsequent murder of a humanitarian worker in North Wello zone in August prompted Fano leaders in Wello to release a statement insisting that the area where the incident occurred had been under government forces’ control.⁵

A breaking point reached

At the beginning of September, public outrage over a degradation of security reached a high point. The kidnapping of a 2-year-old child in Gondar city on 30 August and the subsequent killing of the child on 2 September sparked a protest. Protesters clashed with Amhara state police and kebele militias, who opened fire, fatally shooting at least four protesters. Similar public outbursts of anger over a degradation of security could occur in other urban centers of Amhara region in the coming weeks if the situation does not improve.

While an immediate solution to the situation in Amhara region is unlikely to be found, given the lack of dialogue between the government and Fano militias, the general public appears to have reached a breaking point where insecurity has become unbearable. Fighting in Amhara region peaked in August, with the number of recorded battles reaching its highest point since the conflict began in April of 2023. In August, the federal government reported 42 operations against Fano militias in Amhara region, claiming to have inflicted hundreds of fatalities. Despite these operations and an attempt to control narratives about the conflict, it is clear that the government’s capacity for ensuring the safety of civilians has declined significantly among an expansion of Fano militias, opening opportunities for criminal activity. Like in Oromia region, as battles have intensified and expanded geographically, entrepreneuring groups have found ample opportunity to self-fund their political goals through criminal acts.