EPO Monthly Update | October 2024
Two years after the Pretoria agreement, unrest still looms in Tigray

October at a Glance

Vital Trends

In October, ACLED records 209 political violence events and 862 reported fatalities in Ethiopia.
Battles and violence against civilians were the two most common types of events in October, with 141 and 50 incidents, respectively. Most of these events are linked with the ongoing conflict between the government and Fano militias in Amhara region.
In October, ACLED records the most political violence — 139 events and 678 reported fatalities — in Amhara region, followed by Oromia region, with 56 events and 162 reported fatalities.

Two years after the Pretoria agreement, unrest still looms in Tigray

November marks two years since the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the government signed the Pretoria peace agreement — called the Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities — ending the two-year northern Ethiopia conflict. The agreement aimed to permanently halt hostilities between the government and the TPLF. Despite a consensus on parts of the agreement, an internal dispute within the TPLF in 2023 resulted in the formation of two factions — one led by Debretsion Gebremichael, the current chairman of the TPLF, and the other by Getachew Reda, the federally appointed president of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray.

This divide poses a significant threat to the peace established after the agreement was signed in November 2022. Since the Tigray Defense Force (TDF) has not yet disarmed and demobilized, there is a high probability of violence if the TPLF splits along factional lines. If the federal government steps in to protect the interim administration led by Getachew, it could face a confrontation with forces that support the Debretsion faction. In addition, if the Debretsion faction wins the power struggle, the Pretoria agreement could be compromised: The TPLF chairman’s faction sees the peace deal as a threat to the power of the party and the region and has criticized Getachew and other members of the TPLF negotiation team for signing it. Any disintegration of the agreement could lead to dire consequences for Tigrayans who have not yet recovered from the two-year conflict.

The origin of the TPLF’s internal dispute

Signs of discord among the top leaders of the TPLF emerged only days after the peace agreement was signed. On 22 November 2022, the head of the TDF, General Tadesse Werede, said there were political and military forces within the TPLF that did not accept the peace agreement.¹ Additionally, both the TPLF Central Committee and the TPLF-dominated Tigray regional government released multiple statements seeking modifications to the terms.² These statements asserted that the agreement was established between the Tigray regional government and the federal government instead of the TPLF and the federal government. This distinction was crucial for the TPLF, which wanted to negotiate as the regional government of Tigray — a legitimate ruling body — rather than as an armed group in order to continue as the regional government instead of establishing an interim regional government as per the peace agreement.

However, at the time the agreement was signed, the federal government did not view the former TPLF-led regional government as a legitimate entity. The TPLF had openly defied national electoral regulations by conducting its own regional election in September 2020, just months before the conflict erupted in November. The federal government declared the election “illegal”³ and, after the conflict erupted, it designated the TPLF as a terrorist group.⁴

In the second quarter of 2023, after the agreement was signed and implementation had begun, new disputes emerged over how and which aspects of the peace agreement the party and its leaders should assess internally. A central issue was differences over which period of time the evaluation should consider.⁵ This difference created two factions. The Getachew faction advocates for the assessment to concentrate on the period since the onset of the conflict, aiming to evaluate the TPLF’s and its leaders’ performance during the war and determine accountability for the devastation in Tigray resulting from the conflict. The Debretsion faction — to which many refer as the old guard group⁶ — prefers to begin from the establishment of the interim regional government in March 2023.⁷ The Debretsion faction blames Getachew for signing the agreement without consulting with TPLF. According to the Debretsion faction, the negotiation team, which was led by Getachew, was only given the power to negotiate for a ceasefire but allegedly signed an agreement that consisted of more details on other political issues, like disarmament, disputed territories, and the establishment of the interim regional administration. The Debretsion faction is against the interim regional government being overseen by the federal government and has stated that the agreement weakened the TPLF.⁸ Moreover, the Debretsion faction accuses Getachew of siding with the Abiy-led federal government.⁹ In Tigray, Abiy’s government is viewed as an enemy of Tigray due to the conflict. Getachew refuted the accusation and insisted his team had TPLF’s full consent for the content of the agreement and that he had fulfilled his assignment, which was to secure a ceasefire by any means.¹⁰

This internal dispute began to play out publicly in October 2023, when the Debretsion faction held a conference for TPLF cadres in Mekele. This conference aimed to evaluate Getachew and the interim government, using a democratic-centralist process known as Gimgema. However, the conference, which had the participation of 82% of the party’s cadres, ended without achieving this goal.¹¹ The Getachew-led interim regional government removed the heads of the zonal public relations offices in East, South, Central, Southeast, Northwest, and West zones, over their roles in organizing and participating in the conference. Getachew accused these officials of “violating procedures” for organizing the conference.¹² One report indicated that the TPLF Central Committee held a two-month-long meeting starting in November 2023 to evaluate the cause of the conflict and the status of the region and decided to remove many TPLF officials, including Debretsion. However, allegedly military generals who were attending the meeting as observers stopped the meeting stating the need to resolve this issue through negotiation rather than removing the officials.¹³

The race to control the TPLF and the interim government

The TPLF’s main support base lies in Tigray region. Tigrayans view most TPLF issues as Tigrayan issues and consider TPLF-related issues to be pivotal to the unity of the region. Debretsion has been a member of the TPLF since the 1970s and was the head of the group’s communications, including its famous radio station Demtse Weyane. He became the most influential member of the TPLF in 2012 after the death of then-Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and became party chairman in 2017. Since Abiy took power in 2018, Debretsion has been the de facto regional president of Tigray, though he was officially a deputy regional president as he was not a member of the Tigray regional council, rendering him ineligible for the top post.¹⁴ He officially became the regional president after the September 2020 regional election and led the region and the party during the two-year conflict.

In an effort to dominate the majority voice within the TPLF and sway public opinion, the Debretsion faction raced to hold the party’s 14th general assembly in August 2024. The Debretsion faction was hoping to regain the TPLF’s legal status from the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) while Debretsion was still a chairman and then hold the 14th general assembly, oust the Getachew faction, and legally control the party. Hence, according to Getachew, Debretsion sent the reinstatement application to NEBE without the knowledge of the TPLF Central Committee.¹⁵ However, the NEBE rejected the TPLF’s request to reinstate its legal status as a party, instead saying that the TPLF must conduct a general assembly, elect new leaders, and ratify party bylaws within the next six months for the registration process to move forward. The NEBE further stipulated that it must be informed at least 21 days prior to the general assembly to ensure its members could oversee the event.

Despite this requirement and a warning from NEBE and Abiy against holding the assembly without meeting the established criteria, the Debretsion faction proceeded with the 14th general assembly in Mekele. By the end of the two-day event, Debretsion was re-elected as the chairman of the party, and 16 members of the executive committee who are part of the Getachew faction, including Getachew himself, were dismissed from the party.¹⁶ The Getachew faction boycotted the general assembly and held a meeting with the public to discuss activities to save the TPLF from disintegrating. Most of South Tigray zone, South-East Tigray zone, and Mekele city woredas did not attend the general assembly.¹⁷ Some observers have indicated that the factions are attempting to mobilize support based on location,¹⁸ and particularly based on the two leaders’ birthplaces: Debretsion is from Shire in northern Tigray, and Getachew is from Alamata in southern Tigray. The reality may be more complex. On 15 September, Getachew faced some opposition during a public meeting in Shire when some participants allegedly influenced by the Debretsion faction started shouting at and expressing opposition to Getachew. At the same time, others showed support for him. A Mekelle University researcher has also noted that some in Adwa and Shire, Debretsion’s birthplace, align with Getachew, and some from southern Tigray align with Debretsion,¹⁹ illustrating that Tigrayan support for the factions does not divide neatly along geographical lines.

Both factions are framing their internal disagreements as critical to the party’s and Tigray’s survival, while also calling for unity. This has created tension in Tigray and beyond the region, with many people fearing another round of violence. These fears are in part because the TDF has not yet been disarmed and demobilized — but currently, it seems like neither faction has the upper hand to control the TDF. According to Getachew, the TDF members who are not yet disarmed number over 270,000.²⁰ Since the end of the two-year conflict, the first armed clashes involving TDF were reported in February 2024. This armed group, usually referred to as Army 24 or Tigray ethnic militias, has been involved in armed clashes with kebele militias and Amhara ethnic militias in disputed territories in Southern and North-Western Tigray zones (see map below).

In October, after the Getachew faction announced its intention to hold a new 14th general assembly and remove Debretsion faction leaders from party leadership using legal means, the Debretsion faction responded by removing 13 Getachew faction members from the interim regional government and replacing them with its own members. At the time of writing this report, there is no indication that the newly appointed leaders have taken office. The Getachew faction’s announcement that it was preparing the 14th assembly might have pushed the Debretsion faction to take immediate action to control both the TPLF and the interim government.

Potential outcomes

Based on previous similar fragmentation, two outcomes are most likely. The first is that one of the factions will control both TPLF and the interim government, sidelining the opposing faction and detaining their leaders. The second outcome is violence. The internal dispute could involve the assassination of the leaders of the factions. It could also result in an armed confrontation between the supporters of the two factions or between an armed group that supports the Debretsion faction — this could possibly be members of TDF — and government forces that could step in to protect the interim regional government. What sets the current internal dispute within the TPLF apart from previous splits is that it is transpiring after the TPLF lost its status as Ethiopia’s ruling party. Tigray region has been severely impacted by the northern Ethiopia conflict, and the TPLF no longer controls all government institutions nationwide. Getachew was appointed by Abiy and can only be dismissed by the prime minister. Abiy may appoint another neutral member of TPLF as the interim regional administration’s president. Additionally, it is essential for the TPLF to complete its registration in order to take part in the sixth general election, establish a regional government, and occupy the seats allocated for Tigray in the House of Representatives. The sixth general election was held in 2021 throughout the country, but it was not conducted in Tigray due to the ongoing conflict. The existing internal struggles will hinder the formation of a regional government — as stipulated by the peace agreement — through an election. Further, if the TPLF does not convene the general assembly within the NEBE’s timeframe, which begins in August 2024, what consequences it will face regarding its temporary registration is unclear. If it fails to hold the general assembly as per the requirement of NEBE, it could lose its temporary registration. But the current electoral regulations do not provide a definite answer. Currently, there is no strong opposition party in Tigray that can replace the TPLF and take over the administration. Over the past three decades, the TPLF has successfully weakened opposition parties in the region, and most Tigrayans consider the TPLF to be central to their identity. If TPLF fails to register as a party, it cannot participate in the upcoming regional election.

The US has stressed the need for the two factions to resolve their differences through dialogue.²¹ The US also wants the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the TDF to start this month.²² The region is still recovering from the two-year war and cannot afford another round of hostilities. Some of the internally displaced people from the disputed territories of Tigray have not yet returned to their residences.²³ Tigrayans are scared of another round of violence due to the TPLF’s internal dispute. Hence, civil society organizations and religious leaders are trying to bring the two factions to resolve their differences through dialogue, but so far, there has been no success.²⁴ Some Tigrayans believe the two factions are fighting to grab power for themselves and expressed the need for another political party that could lead the region, while others believe the Debretsion faction is saying that no other group but the TPLF can maintain power in Tigray.²⁵