Ethiopia situation update (5 February 2025)

Reporting period: 14 December 2024 to 31 January 2025¹Some events in the coverage period will be included in subsequent updates of ACLED’s database. ACLED is a living dataset and figures are subject to change as new information becomes available. For more information about how ACLED collects data and categorizes events, see the ACLED Codebook.

At a glance

In Tigray, tensions heightened following the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s (TPLF) internal dispute, after the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)’s announcement on 27 December 2024 urging the party to convene its general assembly meeting, as per stipulated conditions. Since that announcement, there has been a significant rise in demonstration events across Tigray region. Most of these demonstrations were organized either in support of or in opposition to one of the factions. Meanwhile, political violence in Amhara and Oromia regions decreased during the reporting period. Fighting between Fano militias and government forces subsided in Amhara, while in Oromia, violence involving the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane — has likewise decreased since the signing of the peace agreement between OLA/OLF-Shane faction led by Sanyi Nagasa and the government on 1 December 2024.

The TPLF rift intensifies as the deadline for a general assembly approaches

The internal dispute within the TPLF escalated in January 2025. This factional struggle pits the group loyal to the president of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray and deputy chairman of the TPLF, Getachew Reda, against that led by the president of TPLF, Debretsion Gebremichael. The escalation came on the heels of an ultimatum Ethiopia’s election board issued on 26 December 2024 urging the TPLF to convene its general assembly meeting — a key step in the group’s path to re-registration as a political party — before the 10 February deadline.³Facebook, National Election Board of Ethiopia, 31 December 2024; YouTube @ethiopiareporter, ‘The directive that put the TPLF in a dilemma,’ 15 January 2025 As the two factions ramped up their efforts to control the TPLF and the interim regional administration, around 200 senior leaders of the Tigray forces issued a statement siding with the Debretsion faction, heightening the risk of a resurgence of violence in the region. 

The TPLF lost its legal political party status after it took up arms against the government in November 2020, triggering a two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia. On 9 August 2024, the NEBE re-registered the TPLF as a party, but with special preconditions: Before the registration process can move forward, the TPLF must conduct a general assembly, elect new leaders, and ratify party bylaws within six months.⁴Abraham Tekle, ‘Election Board reinstates TPLF under ‘special circumstances,’ Reporter, 10 August 2024 The six-month mark is on 10 February. Additionally, the NEBE mandated that it be notified at least 21 days prior to the general assembly to enable its members to oversee the proceedings. 

Since then, the two factions have raced to control both the TPLF and the Tigray interim administration. To ensure dominance within the TPLF and influence public perception, the Debretsion faction rushed to conduct the party’s 14th general assembly shortly after the NEBE’s announcement. However, this faction held the 14th general assembly in August in Mekele, skipping the notification requirement. During this assembly, the faction expelled Getachew and its supporters from the party and appointed loyalists to fill the vacant positions. 

After the assembly, the Debretsion faction set its sights on the interim administration, demanding it be restructured and alleging that non-TPLF members occupied certain administration positions. The Debretsion faction claims the agreement for the establishment of the Tigray regional administration mandates that the TPLF control 15 seats (50% +1) of the interim administration. However, the agreement establishes that the administration would consist of 28 members, and 50% of these members would be from the TPLF, 29% from Tigray forces, and the remaining 21% from opposition parties. Meanwhile, the Getachew faction expressed its intention to restore the party’s legal status, convene its 14th general assembly, and legally oust the leaders of the Debretsion faction⁵Mulgeta Atsebeha, ‘The leaders of the TPLF, led by Mr. Geta, said that they are preparing to hold a conference,’ VOA Amharic, 2 October 2024; Luwam Atakilti, ‘“We will save the party by peacefully and legally eliminating the TPLF wing that held the conference” TPLF faction led by Getachew Reda,’ The Reporter, 2 October 2024 (for more on the internal dispute, see EPO Monthly Update: October 2024).

Until the start of the new year, Tigray security forces chose not to express support for either group, maintaining that the two factions should settle their disputes through peaceful dialogue. However, on 23 January 2025, approximately 200 senior leaders from the Tigray forces issued a statement endorsing the resolutions from the 14th general assembly convened by the Debretsion faction and calling for the reorganization of the interim administration to include members from the Debretsion-led TPLF. Several high-ranking officials within the Tigray forces, including General Tadese Werede, the commander-in-chief, were not involved, according to reports.⁶The statement was released after a six-day meeting among the leaders of the Tigray forces. Reportedly, the majority of the leaders supported this statement, and only 14 senior commanders walked out or were not present when the decision was read to the public. See Million Haileselase, Shewaye Legese, and Mantegaftot Seleshi, ‘The ongoing controversy in Tigray region,’ DW Amharic, 23 January 2025; Borkena, ‘Rallies for rival groups in Tigray as tension escalates.’ 26 January 2025 The president of the interim administration, Getachew, referred to this action as a “coup.”⁷BBC Amharic, ‘Getachew Reda accused Tigray army commanders of “declaring a coup,”’ 24 January 2025 

The Tigray security force leaders’ resolution sparked fear of a resurgence of violence in the region and was met with opposition from some residents and politicians.⁸Mulegeta Atsebeha, ‘Residents fear renewed fighting in Tigray region,’ VOA Amharic, 24 January 2025 From 25 to 27 January, ACLED records 31 demonstrations across the region’s major towns, including the capital, Mekele. At least 13 demonstrations were held in support of the security leaders’ decision in Central, Eastern, North Western, and South Eastern Tigray zones, and Mekele city (see map below). Meanwhile, 17 demonstrations opposing the decision took place in Mekele city and across Southern, Eastern, North Western, Central, and South Eastern Tigray zones. At least one demonstration turned violent, when security forces in Wikro town in Eastern Tigray zone grabbed the microphone from demonstrators who were against the resolution, fired at the tires of a vehicle they were using, and scattered the crowd. At least three people were reportedly injured due to being assaulted by security forces. 

Amid fears of a resurgence of violence, numerous residents were observed withdrawing substantial sums of money from banks due to concerns over potential violence, while the cost of essential goods surged throughout Tigray.⁹Million Haileselase, Azeb Tadese, and Tsehay Chane, ‘Inflation in Tigray due to political instability,’ DW Amharic, 30 January 2025 This new development forced Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to release a statement on 3 February calling for Tigrayan elites and people to choose peace. Most members of the Tigray Defense Force (TDF) have not yet been demobilized. Last year, Getachew indicated that over 270,000 members of the TDF were still armed.¹⁰VOA Amharic, ‘Getachew Reda: There is still mistrust between the federal government and the Tigray region,’ 13 February 2024 Even though the rehabilitation of former fighters began in November 2024 in the region, and 5,000 former fighters were reported to have demobilized and reintegrated in late December,¹¹Million Haileselase, Shewaye Legese, and Hirut Melese, ‘More than 5,000 former fighters in Tigray region return to normal life,’ DW Amharic, 23 December 2024 recent reports indicate that the rehabilitation process has stopped due to budget shortages.¹²Nardos Yoseph, ‘Tigray disarmament program freezes before first phase wraps up: ex-combatants,’ The Reporter, 1 February 2025 The Debretsion faction and the 200 leaders of the Tigray forces are against the demobilization process, citing the presence of non-Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) forces in Tigray region.¹³Mulgeta Atsbeha, ‘Tigray regional security leaders support Dr. Debre Tsion’s group’s proposal,’ VOA Amharic, 23 January 2025; Mulgeta Atsbeha, ‘“The Tigray Army is being disbanded in the name of DDR” – TPLF led by Dr. Debre Tsion Gebremichael,’ VOA Amharic, 20 December 2024 The contested Welkait, Tsegede, and Humera woredas in Western Tigray zone are still controlled by an administration supported by Amhara region. Eritrean forces also controlled some areas at the border of the two countries.¹⁴Wanofi Solomon, ‘Eritrea expands hold on Irob, Gulomahda amid Tigray political feud, federal inaction,’ The Reporter, 21 September 2024 Hence, the recent shift among many top leaders in the Tigray forces to support the Debretsion faction threatens the peace achieved through the Pretoria Agreement, which halted the violence in northern Ethiopia but shows modest progress in terms of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Fano insurgency subsides in Amhara

For the first time since September 2024, fighting between government forces and Fano militias appears to be slowing down in Amhara region. From 15 December 2024 to 31 January 2025, ACLED records 97 battles between these actors, a 44% decrease compared to the previous seven weeks. The majority of battle incidents were recorded in North Shewa, East Gojam, and West Gojam zones, indicating a slight shift from the prior period, during which most battle events occurred in West Gojam zone, followed by East Gojam and North Shewa zones. 

Three factors may have contributed to this decrease in battle events. First, multiple major religious holidays occurred during the reporting period. Second, the government announced that over 4,000 Fano militia members had surrendered to the government in Amhara region. At least one Fano militia leader rejected the statement, saying no militia members had surrendered.¹⁵Negash Mohamed and Azeb Tadese, ‘“We will not negotiate with a fallen enemy,” Fano spokesman,’ DW Amharic, 17 January 2025 Third, members of the diplomatic community from the United States, the European Union, the African Union, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development recently held discussions with certain Fano militias,¹⁶Wazema Radio, ‘The conversation between Fano and the diplomats,’ 27 January 2025 though it is unclear which militias attended. The only meeting that was confirmed was with the Amhara People’s Fano Front.¹⁷Harun Maruf, ‘Amhara Fano People’s Organization announced that it had held discussions with representatives of the international community,’ VOA Amharic, 28 January 2025; Negash Mohamed and Tsehay Chane, ‘Amhara Fano People’s Organization says “I did not negotiate” with the government (Corrected),’ DW Amharic, 30 January 2025; Youtube @EthiopianMediaServices, ‘EMS “We will remove and replace Prosperity” Jan 2025,’ 28 January 2025 The Amhara People’s Fano Front leader affirmed the group’s commitment to continuing the fight against the government, acknowledging that the lack of unity among Fano militias affected their strength.¹⁸YouTube @EthiopianMediaServices, ‘EMS “We will remove and replace Prosperity” Jan 2025,’ 28 January 2025 

Civilians continued to suffer violence perpetrated by both parties to the conflict. From 15 December 2024 to 31 January, ACLED records 21 civilian targeting events in the region, with 48% reportedly perpetrated by the ENDF. 

The peace agreement with Sanyi’s OLA/OLF-Shane faction holds in Oromia 

Violence decreased by 57% in Oromia region after the OLA/OLF-Shane faction led by Sanyi Nagasa signed a peace agreement with the Oromia regional government on 1 December 2024. Hundreds of OLA/OLF-Shane fighters from Sanyi Nagasa’s faction began to enter rehabilitation camps immediately after signing the agreement (for more, see Ethiopia Weekly Update (10 December 2024) and Ethiopia Weekly Update (17 December 2024)). However, it is too early to analyze the impact of this peace agreement. Sporadic reports of violence directed mainly against civilians and attributed to the OLA/OLF-Shane have emerged in recent weeks from Oromia. From 14 December 2024 to 31 January 2025, out of 27 recorded violence targeting civilians events, 15 attacks were perpetrated by security forces.