EPO October 2023 Monthly: Ethiopia’s International Relations

IN THIS REPORT

October at a Glance
- Vital Trends
- Key Developments
Monthly Focus: Ethiopia’s International Relations

October at a Glance

VITAL TRENDS

In October, ACLED records 155 political violence events and 648 reported fatalities in Ethiopia.
ACLED records most political violence – 93 events and 419 reported fatalities – in Oromia region, where the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane clashed with government forces and Fano militias. In Amhara region, Fano militias and government forces have been clashing since August, with 54 events and 203 reported fatalities during October.
In October, battles and violence against civilians were the two most commonly recorded events, with 105 and 45 events, respectively. Last month, the overall recorded incidents of political violence decreased throughout the country.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Monthly Focus: Examining Ethiopia’s International Relations

Throughout October, active insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia regions pushed Ethiopia deeper into a long period of worsening insecurity. The long-awaited national dialogue, designed to bring the country’s populations back into some common political understanding, has been slow due to violent conflicts in various locations.¹ Dozens of battles and violence against civilians events recorded in both regions last month indicate that violence is unlikely to abate anytime soon and may worsen in the coming months. The federal government faces serious financial difficulties, and the country’s financial credibility rating has dropped.² Despite these internal challenges, Ethiopia’s position on the international stage improved significantly in October, giving the government a rare opportunity for solid footing in internal and external affairs. This report discusses Ethiopia’s international relations, comparing its standing during the northern Ethiopia conflict period with its current position a year after the signing of the peace agreement that ended the conflict.

Fraught International Standing During the Northern Ethiopia Conflict

Since the start of the northern conflict in November 2020, Abiy Ahmed’s government has faced a series of escalating actions from the European Union and United States over accusations of human rights abuses during the conflict in Tigray region. In January 2021, the EU suspended its budgetary support after it accused the federal government of restricting the access of aid organizations to Tigray region.³ In September 2021, the US imposed sanctions on individuals and businesses involved in economic activity that could contribute to the humanitarian and human rights crisis in Ethiopia, later resulting in the country becoming ineligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).⁴ This exclusion from AGOA led to at least 5,000 workers of Hawassa Industrial Park losing their jobs as the companies lost free trade access to the US market.⁵ Ethiopia’s international relations hit an all-time low in October 2021 when the government expelled seven United Nations officials, accusing them of interfering in the country’s internal affairs.⁶ In December 2021, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees established the International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia, mandating it to “investigate allegations of violations and abuses of international human rights law, humanitarian law, and refugee law in Ethiopia”⁷ (for a detailed timeline of the northern Ethiopia conflict and additional actions taken, see the EPO Special Report, The Northern Conflict: A Step Towards Peace).

The effect of sanctions and aid restrictions in Ethiopia was multifold. An initial reaction was the creation of a large movement dubbed ‘no-more,’ calling for no more foreign intervention in Ethiopia. The anti-Western political movement held mass demonstrations in Western countries, especially in the US and Ethiopia, and rallied support for the Ethiopian government. On the economic front, the country’s economy and credit rating, and thus financial reputation, suffered terribly throughout 2021 among lending states and organizations. Severe foreign currency debt hindered imports and crippled business.⁸ While Russia and China opposed measures taken by Western countries against Ethiopia, neither offered much in terms of practical support.⁹ These factors were all at play during the northern conflict, and contributed to strained relations with other countries, international bodies, and polarized diaspora populations — much of which continues today.

One Year After the Peace Agreement

Ethiopia’s foreign relationships improved significantly in October 2023, with international partners reversing many of their previous actions and adopting new policies. On 3 October, the EU reinstated its budgetary support, pledging 650 million euros (about US$710 million) in aid and indicated it wished to “gradually normalize relations.”¹⁰

The International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia released its final report during the UN’s 54th Human Rights Council session on 13 October, finding that “the Ethiopian National Defense Forces, Eritrean Defence Forces, regional forces and affiliated militias perpetrated violations and abuses in Tigray…that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.”¹¹ Despite these findings — and some evidence suggesting crimes are continuing¹² — no country present at the council session indicated support for the continuation of the commission, effectively ensuring its end. EU diplomats, originally supportive of its creation, expressed confidence that the Ethiopian government would continue investigations into human rights abuses.¹³ Similar confidence came from the US and the African Union in June 2023. US President Joe Biden’s administration lifted the human rights violation designation on Ethiopia after informing Congress that Ethiopia “no longer is engaging in a pattern of gross violations of human rights.”¹⁴ Finally, the African Union backed Commission of Inquiry on the Situation in the Tigray Region of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was terminated in June 2023.¹⁵ However, 30 different human rights organizations — including Amnesty International, the Center for Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), and Human Rights Watch — all condemned the decision made by the African Union, citing the “impartiality of the judiciary” in Ethiopia that could hamper any government effort to take charge of accountability and justice.¹⁶

Dropping the various restrictions designed to pressure the federal government into better aligning its actions with the status quo represents a significant shift in policy by the international community. Much of this change could be attributed to Ethiopia’s importance in the region, as there is a lack of a viable alternative partner in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is a leading contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping operations, host to the African Union, and key to stability in the Horn of Africa region. Cold relationships between Ethiopia and its Western allies meant a reduction of their influence and steering ability for the Horn region, whose security concerns include threats like al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Eritrean government. Thus, the country’s international partners have a vested interest in avoiding yet another year of instability in Ethiopia.

While violence and clashes persist, and Ethiopia’s security situation remains volatile, the normalizing of relationships internationally could give the Ethiopian government tools that may have not been available from 2020 to 2022. Humanitarian aid, budget support, and assistance with the facilitation of additional peace deals have now become available for the federal government, widening its ability to operate. All have been released on the premise that the federal government has been a willing actor in ending the northern Ethiopia conflict, patient with the peace process, and progressive in pursuing a national solution for ensuring the protection of human rights.

These advantages seem to have emboldened the ruling Prosperity party, and a new internal direction is beginning to form. For the last two years, there has been no clear path forward for the decision over the status of Western and Southern Tigray zones. The disputed territory officially belongs to Tigray region but has been de facto administered by Amhara region since the start of the conflict in November 2020. Fearing a negative reaction from powerful ethno- nationalist militias in Amhara region, the government has tread carefully around the issue and no official plan for the area has been announced. On 6 November, this changed when the federal government announced a decision that the internally displaced people from “contested areas” in Tigray region would be returned and that the status of these areas would be decided by referendum.¹⁷ This move followed another recent bold reform; in April, the government announced the elimination of the country’s regional special forces, sparking widespread conflict in Amhara region (for more, see the EPO Monthly: April 2023 and the EPO Monthly: August 2023).

The perception that the Ethiopian government is willing and able to lead on “investigations into human rights abuses”¹⁸ and that the federal authorities are committed to ensuring the protection of civilians may be in question. A report issued by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission in October confirmed the death of many civilians due to government activity in Amhara region, including drone strikes and house-to-house searches.¹⁹ However, the report was dismissed by federal officials as “not based on accurate information and lack[ing] balance.”²⁰ Government-led initiatives for justice, including a planned national dialogue process and transitional justice, have faced scrutiny over transparency issues and inclusivity. Dozens of journalists have been arrested in connection with Ethiopia’s latest state of emergency declared on 4 August, some detained in military camps.²¹ Violence levels in the country have shifted geographically over the past year but remain high. Most concerning, violence perpetrated by government security forces targeting civilians has continued, with 18 incidents resulting in an estimated 68 fatalities in the month of October alone (see graph below).

Moving Forward

In the coming months, the status of the contested land in Western and Southern Tigray zones will be a litmus test for the government’s new direction and ability to enforce its will within the country. The government’s desire to first return all internally displaced people to their homes and then organize and carry out a referendum is an enormously difficult task that could provoke further violence, especially in Amhara region. Political and legal issues with the constitution, ethnic claims to land, and the power of the central government will all need to be addressed. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has consistently shown his willingness to use military force — even when it comes at high costs — and will likely enforce the will of his party with the federal army. While conflict with Fano militias has been a challenge for the government in Amhara region over the last few months, the ENDF has thus far not faced serious resistance and successfully taken control of most of the region, pushing the militias to peripheral areas. There will likely be some resistance among the general population if a referendum decides to remove the contested areas from the Amhara region’s direct administration. However, it is not yet clear if disagreement with decisions made about Western and Southern Tigray zones will garner enough additional support for Fano militias to become a challenge for the federal government. Western countries appear to have little to no interest in pressuring the government against taking additional military action, as evidenced by the removal of various restrictions earlier this year. If the government is able to finally resolve the land issue and enforce its decision, it could spell the end for Amhara ethnonationalist movements — many of whom have proclaimed that Western and Southern Tigray zones issue is non-negotiable.²²

Ethiopia’s international relations continue to improve even while its internal issues remain unresolved. Yet, this improvement certainly gives the government a much-needed advantage as it moves to tackle some of the most pressing political issues in the country today. Whether restored support from the international community will translate into a more peaceful and prosperous Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed’s remains an open question.