Ethiopia situation update (11 June 2025)

Civilians face OLA/OLF-Shane attacks in Oromia and Benshangul/Gumuz

Between 24 May to 6 June, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane — carried out attacks in three locations in the Oromia and Benshangul/Gumuz regions, resulting in 13 people reportedly killed. In Oromia, members of the OLA/OLF-Shane shot and killed three civilians on 4 June, including an Orthodox Christian monk, and wounded two others in Angodeche Hula Arboye kebele in Jeju woreda in Arsi zone. After the attack, the group reportedly looted livestock and abducted an unspecified number of civilians, including the wife and mother of the kebele administrator. A few days later, 11 abductees were released.¹Telegram, @tikvahethiopia, 1 June 2025 (Amharic) This is the second incident of violence targeting civilians in Jeju woreda in the past four weeks. Two weeks earlier, on 18 May, members of the OLA/OLF-Shane shot and killed a woman near Arboye town and abducted five others. The armed group released some of the victims after receiving an unknown amount of ransom money.

In the Metekel zone of Benshangul/Gumuz region, OLA/OLF-Shane militants attacked people and buildings in Berber kebele (also called Barbara) in Debati woreda and Bulen town on 6 June. Following the OLA/OLF-Shane attack in Bulen town, the militants clashed with government security forces. The attack mainly targeted bankers, businessmen, government institutions, and shops. At least 10 people, including seven members of the security forces and three civilians, were killed, and several others were injured. At least five people, including one bank manager, were abducted. 

The militant group targeted key institutions in Bulen, including the woreda police station, the regional Riot Police camp, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) camp, a branch of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the Bulen woreda telecommunication office, the Bulen Primary Hospital, and various commercial establishments. Members of the OLA/OLF-Shane forced a bank manager to open the branch of the bank where he worked so the militants could loot it before abducting him. The militants extensively looted several facilities. They reportedly departed from the town the same day with trucks and motorbikes carrying the stolen property. Security reinforcements comprising the ENDF, regional riot police, and Federal Police forces were subsequently deployed to Bulen.

Similar incidents were recorded in May and April. On 21 May, members of the OLA/OLF-Shane clashed with the ENDF after the militants attacked civilians in Anger Meti town (also known as Asyesanjedim) in Kemashi zone, resulting in the deaths of at least 18 civilians, and injuring at least 10 others. The people killed included 12 children between 2 and 14 years of age. The militants also abducted three civilians, burned down over 100 civilian homes and properties, and looted 500 quintals (50,000 kilograms) of food. In April, kebele militias clashed with the OLA/OLF-Shane at an unspecified location near Anger Meti after the militants opened fire and killed an undisclosed number of civilians in Anger Meti. 

Since September 2018, Metekel and Kemashi zones have been hotspots of violence. Throughout 2020 and 2021, the Metekel zone was one of the most violent areas in the country outside of the northern Ethiopia conflict. At that time, government sources often refused to identify the perpetrators in these incidents, and news reports pointed to Gumuz ethnic militias.²For example, see this report: Facebook, @EBCzena, 19 November 2021 (Amharic) However, the perpetrators were likely associated with more formally organized ethno-nationalistic movements such as the Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement and the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement. While the OLA/OLF-Shane was involved in some violent episodes during this timeframe, their role was less prominent. Violence decreased starting in 2022 following federal military interventions and the imposition of a state of emergency in late January 2021. Additionally, regional authorities implemented various conflict mitigation strategies, including peace agreements with armed groups (for more on the conflict dynamic in the region see the EPO’s Benshangul/Gumuz region profile and Metekel conflict profile). 

Political competition and growing volatility in Tigray

On 26 May, federal police forces blocked the entry of all commercial trucks transporting goods to the Tigray region at the Mile Sardo checkpoint in Afar. A similar blockade was imposed the following day at the Woldiya checkpoint in Amhara, leaving numerous trucks stranded for several days. The federal government did not initially provide a public explanation for these measures, prompting the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray to seek clarification.

The restrictions were lifted on 1 June following high-level discussions between the interim president of Tigray and the commissioner of the Federal Police Commission. According to statements made during the meeting, federal authorities had imposed the blockade based on suspicions that goods intended for Tigray were being illicitly rerouted and exported into Eritrea, raising concerns about cross-border contraband activity.³Telegram @tikvahethiopia, 1 June 2025 (Amharic)

These developments occurred amid a broader deterioration in relations between the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments. Tension between the two governments has been rising since former Ethiopian President Mulatu Teshome Wirtu accused the Eritrean government of rapprochement with some Tigray Defense Force (TDF) generals and factions of the Fano militias.⁴Mulatu Teshome Wirtu, “To avoid another conflict in the Horn of Africa, now is the time to act,” Aljazeera, 17 February 2025; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Rising Tensions in Tigray Risk Regional Conflict,” 26 March 2025; Africa Confidential, “Tigray’s political fight sounds alarm,” 21 March 2025 Prior to April 2025, there was no public sign that the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) — the ruling party in Tigray — had re-established its relationship with the Eritrean government. Despite the absence of official ties, Ethiopian federal authorities and the former interim administration in Tigray have alleged that certain TPLF and TDF leaders have entered into covert arrangements with Asmara, potentially aimed at reigniting conflict in the Tigray region.⁵YouTube @fanabroadcastingcorporate, 13 March 2025 (Amharic); YouTube @Reyot, 17 March 2025 (Amharic); BBC Amharic, “The Ethiopian government has accused one of the TPLF wings of having ties to foreign forces,” 14 March 2025 (Amharic); Facebook @VOAAmharic, 11 March 2025 (Amharic) 

Various developments in May, however, suggest a possible recalibration of relations between the TPLF and the Eritrean government. These developments include a message of congratulations from the TPLF leadership to the Eritrean government commemorating Eritrea’s 34th Independence Day. In the message, the TPLF professed its intention to strengthen its relationship with Eritrea.⁶Million Haileselase, Mantegafetot Seleshi, and Tamirat Dinsa, “Ginbot 20 celebration only in Tigray region,” DW Amharic, 28 May 2025 (Amharic) In addition, prominent TPLF activists were observed participating in the celebrations of Eritrea’s independence day in Eritrea, and TPLF activists and Eritrean government activists held meetings within disputed border areas currently under the control of the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF). 

Adding to these developments, reports indicate that on 18 May, the EDF dismantled a long-standing checkpoint along the Adigrat–Zalambessa route in the Eastern Tigray zone for reasons that remain unclear. This checkpoint had been in place since the outbreak of the war in 2020 and served as a symbol of Eritrea’s entrenched military presence in the region. These symbolic gestures, coupled with the travel of renowned TPLF supporters to Eritrean soil, may signal a softening of what was previously an adversarial relationship. During the northern Ethiopia conflict (November 2020 to November 2022), the EDF supported the Ethiopian government forces in operations against the TPLF. Despite the Pretoria agreement between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government that ended open hostilities of the northern Ethiopia conflict, Eritrean forces have remained in parts of the Tigray region. 

In parallel with these security and geopolitical developments, the political landscape in Tigray is also undergoing significant transformation. The TPLF faction led by former Interim Regional President Getachew Reda began the process of establishing a new political party named Tigray Democratic Solidarity — also known as Simeret (“solidarity” in Tigregna). On 26 May, this new party received a preliminary registration certificate from the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The founding members include former members of the TPLF who were ousted by the Debretsion faction during the 14th general assembly of the TPLF in August 2024. The party’s founding members assert that efforts to reform the TPLF from within were unsuccessful, prompting them to form a new political platform.⁷Ethiopia Insider, “A new regional party founded by Mr. Getachew Reda has received temporary registration permission from the Election Board,” 26 May 2025 (Amharic); Facebook, @dw.amharic, 31 May 2025 (Amharic) Plans are underway to complete the final steps necessary to attain the official registration certificate, including convening a founding general assembly in Mekele, the region’s capital, which will serve as the party’s headquarters.⁸Solomon Muchie and Eshete Bekele, “The Democratic Solidarity Tigray Party announced that it will hold its founding conference in Mekelle soon,” DW Amharic, 31 May 2025 This development follows the NEBE’s revocation of the TPLF’s legal status as a political party on 13 May, marking a formal shift in the political representation of Tigray at the national level.⁹Facebook, National Election Board of Ethiopia NEBE, 14 May 2025 (Amharic)

Moreover, unprecedented developments in Tigray suggest the political competition is no longer limited to the two TPLF factions. Analysts argue that the TPLF has controlled the political environment in Tigray for over 40 years, which has made the stances of the TPLF and the Tigray people one and the same. However, several opposition groups say they want to chip away at the TPLF’s influence, weakening this narrative. For example, on 20 May the Tigray Independence Party said it planned to use civil disobedience and other “legal” means to launch a struggle to “end the TPLF’s sole decision-making” power in the region.¹⁰Ethiopia Insider, “TIP announces that it will wage a political struggle of popular disobedience in Tigray that will lead to rebellion,” 20 May 2025 (Amharic) On 10 June, one former TDF Brigade General Gebre Egiziabher Beyene (also known as Wedi Antiru) also indicated that he, along with other leaders, established an armed group located at the border of the Tigray and Afar regions. Their stated objective is to be a neutral armed group that stands with the Tigray people, rather than a party.¹¹BBC Amharic, “What do the generals who launched an armed movement against the TPLF say?” 10 June 2025 (Amharic) This general is one of the few who opposed the 200 senior leaders of the TDF who announced their support for the Debretsion faction of the TPLF on 23 January and began confiscating stamps and offices from the interim local administrations led by the former Interim President Getachew on 19 February (for more on these local administration takeovers see the EPO’s Ethiopia situation update (5 March 2025) and Ethiopia situation update (19 March 2025)). Together, these incidents suggest increasing political competition and growing volatility in Tigray.