EPO Monthly Update | February 2024
Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace Deal

February at a Glance

Vital Stats

In February, ACLED records 168 political violence events and 473 reported fatalities in Ethiopia.
Battles and violence against civilians were the two most common event types in February, with 124 and 39 events, respectively.
ACLED records the most political violence in February — 100 events and 341 reported fatalities — in Amhara region. Clashes between Fano militia and government forces, which have been fighting since August, accounted for 77% of the events in the region.

Key Developments

Clashes in Tigray’s Disputed Territories Threaten Peace Deal

In February, forces from Amhara and Tigray regions clashed in disputed territories in Southern Tigray zone, Tigray, marking the first confrontation in this location since the northern Ethiopia conflict ended in November 2022. This clash erupted a day after the president of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray indicated that the Tigray forces — which, according to the president, number over 270,000 — were not disarmed as per the Pretoria peace agreement signed in November 2022.¹ While clashes were short and no fatalities were reported, the renewed fighting is a significant development and threatens the peace the Pretoria agreement achieved.

Authorities from Amhara region have been in de facto control of disputed territory along the Amhara and Tigray regional borders since the beginning of the northern Ethiopia conflict. The disputed territory, as analyzed in this report, includes the entirety of Western Tigray zone — Welkait, Tsegede, and Humera woredas² — Tselemt woreda in North-Western Tigray zone, and Raya-Azebo and Alamata woredas in Southern Tigray zone. Between 1991 and November 2020, the area was administered as part of Tigray region, although a significant number of ethnic Amhara lived there. For the majority of the northern Ethiopia conflict, Amhara militias, including locally organized kebele militias, Fano militias, and Amhara regional special forces, were the main security forces in the area. Since the dissolution of the Amhara regional special police force in April 2023 and the beginning of the conflict between the federal government and Fano militias, the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) has taken control of security along transport routes and in major towns and border zones within the disputed areas.

Clashes between Tigray and Amhara forces began on 14 February in Chercher, Raya Bala, and Raya Alamata woredas in Southern Tigray zone, and on 15 February near Alamata and Korem towns before ENDF forces intervened. Clashes renewed on 17 February in Korem town and Ashenge kebele, Ofla woreda, and were again stopped by the intervention of ENDF troops. On the same day, a Red Cross vehicle was damaged by unidentified gunmen near Korem. Finally, on 21 February, fighting briefly reignited in Zatta woreda until ENDF units were able to halt the clashes.

Map : Armed clash in the Tigray-Amhara border area February 2024

While the identity of those involved in the clashes is not entirely clear, some assumptions can be made. Forces from Amhara region are likely locally organized militias — often referred to as kebele militias — and may include former members of the regional special forces who have been retrained and integrated into local security units.³ Fighters from Tigray region are also likely kebele militias and include some former Tigray Defence Force (TDF) fighters who have been demobilized but not disarmed.

Origins of the Territorial Dispute

Prior to 1991, the contested territories of Raya and Welkait were administered as part of Wello and Gonder provinces, respectively — both currently located within Amhara region.⁴ During the course of Ethiopia’s civil war between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Derg regime, which ended in 1991, these areas were taken over by TPLF forces.⁵ The disputed areas were officially included in the Tigray region after the implementation of ethno-federalism in the 1990s. Amhara activists accuse the TPLF of targeting ethnic Amhara in these areas with “oppression, displacement, and other inhuman treatment” and of resettling thousands of ethnic Tigrayans in the areas due to its productive farmland.⁶ In 2015, Amhara activists organized the Welkait Amhara Identity Question Committee, which gained traction and led protests from 2015 to 2018 against the TPLF-led government. The Committee for the Reconstitution of Raya Identity was established in 2018.⁷

Largely due to the efforts of the ‘identity committees,’ the general population in Amhara region became aware of and invested in the plight of ethnic Amhara residing in the contested territories administered by authorities from Tigray region.⁸ Welkait and Raya became a rallying point for the development of Amhara ethno-nationalism, and its founding members are widely considered the founders of the Fano movement.⁹ Prior to the northern Ethiopia conflict, well-known Amhara nationalist leaders organized fighters around the issue of Welkait and Raya, insisting that ethnic Amhara must take it upon themselves to ensure the safety and security of oppressed Amhara populations in the country.¹⁰

The Northern Ethiopia Conflict

In November 2020, at the outbreak of the northern Ethiopia conflict, Amhara militias, Amhara regional special forces, and Fano militias fought TPLF forces and quickly took control of the contested territories in west and south Tigray. As TPLF forces were withdrawing from areas of western Tigray in the face of advances by Amhara forces, massacres of ethnic Amhara and Tigrayans were reported — including the massacre in Mai Kadra in Humera woreda, Western Tigray zone, where more than 660 people, mostly ethnic Amharas, were killed by Samri youth militia, an informal Tigrayan youth group, in a single day.¹¹

After taking complete control of the disputed territories, local administrators from Amhara region were appointed to govern them. As the disputed territories were reorganized as de facto zones of the Amhara region, many of those appointed to leadership positions were former founders of the identity committees. The official status of these administrators was formally recognized only by Amhara region and not by the federal government.¹² Under the official recognition of the Amhara regional state — and ruling Amhara Prosperity Party leadership — Amhara forces were accused of forcibly removing thousands of ethnic Tigrayans from Western Tigray zone.¹³ Throughout the war, the Amhara regional government maintained full control of the areas in this zone — a high priority as this territory would have given the TPLF full access to a border with Sudan. Meanwhile, Amhara region and the TPLF traded control of Southern Tigray zone throughout the course of the northern Ethiopia conflict, with especially heavy fighting recorded in 2021.

The Pretoria peace agreement, which ended the northern Ethiopia conflict, specified that the parties committed to resolving the issue of “contested territories in accordance with the Constitution.”¹⁴ This suggested, from the signing of the agreement, that a referendum must take place per Ethiopia’s ethno-federalist law, as enshrined in the country’s constitution. In a statement given shortly after the agreement was signed, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed indicated that the two parties had agreed to address territorial disputes through “talks and the country’s law.”¹⁵ In response to the federal government’s decision on the future of the region, demonstrators demanded that the federal government recognize the disputed areas as part of Amhara region (for more, see the EPO Weekly: 3-9 June 2023 and the EPO Weekly: 17-23 June 2023). ACLED records dozens of protests involving thousands of people in Western and Southern Tigray zones in June 2023.

Unavoidable Consequences of a Referendum

The federal government announced in November 2023 that a referendum would decide the status of the disputed territories in Tigray region following the return of internally displaced people.¹⁶ The announcement brought stiff resistance from both sides: Tigray regional authorities opposed the plan and expressed concern that internally displaced Tigrayans could not be returned to their homes while the areas were in the control of Amhara region. Amhara leaders in the disputed territories have stated their willingness to violently prevent the disputed areas from being administered by Tigray authorities. They claim that a referendum is unfair as the area was taken by force, and ethnic Amhara had been the victims of targeted killing and forced displacement for decades, so the decision should be made only by those “indigenous” to the area and not those who had moved in during the TPLF’s rule.¹⁷ Any attempt to assert that Welkait in Western Tigray zone or Raya in Southern Tigray zone are not under Amhara administration will provoke armed resistance.¹⁸ On the other hand, leaving the area in the hands of the Amhara regional authorities risks upending the precarious peace afforded by the Pretoria agreement. The Interim Regional Administration of Tigray is under an intense amount of pressure from internally displaced people wishing to return to their homes in areas controlled by Amhara region. Resources in Tigray region to support displaced people are thin.¹⁹

The clashes between forces from Tigray and Amhara regions in February could spread with disastrous consequences. While it is unlikely that the TPLF is willing to engage in another bloody conflict with the federal government, it may be willing to return to war with Amhara region to regain control of the contested territories in Western and Southern Tigray zones. Despite many efforts, the federal government has failed to defuse the situation as it has been unable to enforce the disarmament of fighters from both sides. In February, the TPLF leadership indicated that 270,000 TDF soldiers remained armed.²⁰ On the Amhara region side, former special force soldiers have been reintegrated into local militias, essentially remaining armed and stationed in the same places they were originally serving.²¹ Locally organized militias in the unofficial Welkait, Tsegede, and Humera zone known as ‘Tekeze Defense Forces’ remain fully armed.²²

The federal government appears to be committed to the plan of resolving the areas through a referendum and enforcing its decision militarily. During the first week of March, Ethiopia’s defense minister reiterated that “federal forces will retain control over these areas to facilitate the repatriation process and to enable residents to conduct local elections upon their return.”²³

Walking a tightrope

Clashes between Fano militias and government forces that engulfed the rest of Amhara region since April 2023 were noticeably absent in Southern and Western Tigray zones. Although the Amhara administrators of the unofficial Welkait, Tsegede, and Humera zone are considered the founders of the broader Fano movement fighting the government in Amhara region, they have chosen to distance themselves from the insurgency. These administrators have prioritized maintaining a defensive position against potential attacks by the TPLF and remain in alignment with the Amhara regional government, enduring some criticism from Fano leadership in the meantime.²⁴ They have allowed the ENDF to quietly take firm control of all major towns and cities in the disputed areas, providing a base from which the ENDF has attacked Fano militias. While the Welkait, Tsegede, and Humera administration commands an experienced force of fighters, it is unlikely that it would be able to resist a multi-sided conflict involving both the TPLF and the ENDF. As administrators of this zone under Amhara, they have accomplished their aims and consider the issue of the ownership of this area as a ‘closed agenda.’²⁵

Clashes between Amhara and Tigray forces that occurred in February were stopped within days by ENDF troops’ swift intervention. Yet, the daunting task of organizing and successfully completing a referendum that solves such a difficult and charged issue seems logistically impossible. Enforcing the announced referendum would likely require the violent removal of the current de facto administrators of the disputed area. Doing so will be impossible without the full strength of the ENDF, whose attention is currently divided among intensifying insurgencies in Oromia and Amhara regions. Over the past months, the government has cracked down hard on dissent, including by stripping immunity from former Amhara regional and Addis Ababa city council members and from the state minister of peace, who is also a member of Oromia regional council.²⁶ The government’s resolution to solve the issue of disputed territories in Tigray through force may initially succeed, but it will be difficult to fully transition into a lasting solution that does not perpetuate violence.