EPO November 2023 Monthly: An Evolving Conflict Environment in Oromia

IN THIS REPORT

November at a Glance
- Vital Trends
- Key Developments
Monthly Focus: An Evolving Conflict Environment in Oromia

November at a Glance

VITAL TRENDS

In November, ACLED records 177 political violence events and 479 reported fatalities in Ethiopia.
ACLED records the most political violence in November — 96 events and 279 reported fatalities — in Amhara region. Clashes between Fano militia and government forces, which have been fighting since August, made up 75% of the events in the region. The second-highest level of political violence — with 74 events and 189 reported fatalities — was recorded in Oromia region, where the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — referred to by the government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane — clashed with government forces and Fano militias.
In November, battles and violence against civilians were the two most commonly recorded events, with 116 and 40 events, respectively. The overall recorded incidents of political violence increased throughout the country.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Monthly Focus: An Evolving Conflict Environment in Oromia

Conflict between the OLA/OLF-Shane and the government security forces, has been ongoing since the OLA/OLF-Shane leadership broke off from the Oromo Liberation Front in April 2019. On 7 November, OLA/OLF-Shane leadership and representatives from the Ethiopian government met in Tanzania for a second round of peace talks, which ended on 21 November without an agreement. Although both sides have indicated their commitment to ending violence,¹ conflict has persisted, with 44 battles resulting in an estimated 91 reported fatalities in November. This report explores the evolution of conflict dynamics in Oromia and analyzes why this second round of peace talks failed and what the future might hold.

Since the first round of peace talks, held from 27 April to 3 May 2023, different geographic locations of fighting, changing actors, and key political shifts have reshaped the conflict environment in Oromia. These changes have not brought the conflict any closer to resolution, and despite the high level of support for last month’s peace talks, neither side has proved willing to compromise on its demands. At the same time, neither side appears to be able to defeat the other militarily. To the disappointment of many, conflict in the Oromia region — now stretching into its sixth year — appears to have no end in sight.

November Snapshot

In November, ACLED records 44 battles involving the OLA/OLF-Shane in Oromia, resulting in an estimated 91 reported fatalities. Violence decreased significantly, albeit temporarily, between 4 and 10 November, while the parties were in negotiations. As talks have failed and no future negotiations have been scheduled, violence is expected to rise again to match levels that persisted throughout 2022.

The second round of peace talks between the federal government and the OLA/OLF-Shane began early in November and ended on 21 November. Top officials from both sides, including OLA/OLF-Shane commander Kumsa Diriba and his deputy commander Gemechu Aboye, attended the conference. Redwan Hussein, national security adviser to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Ethiopian Minister of Justice Gedion Timothewos represented the government.² The talks, held in Tanzania, were facilitated by a delegation led by US Ambassador Mike Hammer, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Kenya, and Norway.³

Talks ended without an agreement. The government attributed the failure to the “intransigence” of the OLA/OLF-Shane leadership.⁴ OLA/OLF-Shane commanders indicated that they had rejected “offers of power” and blamed government representatives for “failing to address the underlying issues affecting the country’s politics and security.”⁵ Senior politicians, including the state minister for peace, human rights organizations, and influential diaspora organizations, have expressed their disappointment in the talks’ unsuccessful outcome, with some pointing to government military actions carried out during the talks.⁶ Some have also complained that the talking points of the peace negotiations were not made publicly available, giving rise to suspicions that officials present at the talks could have been bargaining unilaterally.⁷

Shifting Actors

One of the most significant changes since the end of the first round of peace talks, held in April and May 2023, was to the forces the federal government uses to combat the OLA/OLF-Shane insurgency. Before the peace talks, the Oromo regional special forces — created to fight insurgencies — were the primary force engaged in battles with the OLA/OLF-Shane in Oromia region. In early April 2023, the Ethiopian government announced the dissolution of the country’s regional special forces. By 13 April, it was announced that the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and federal police had taken over security duties in Oromia⁸ (for more information, see the EPO Monthly: April 2023).

While the announced dissolution of regional special forces sparked demonstrations, riots, and battles in the Amhara region, it had the opposite effect in Oromia region, where in April, violence dropped to its lowest levels since July 2021. The first round of peace talks, which began in April, occurred in a context of decreased political violence in the region and amid high hopes that the warring parties could reach an agreement. Multiple factors help explain this drop in violence in Oromia region. First, unlike in Amhara region, the public in the Oromia region never viewed the special forces as critical in protecting Oromo interests. On the contrary, the Oromia regional special forces had been involved in several high-profile incidents against important Oromo cultural figures, including the killing of several traditional Karrayyu leaders in December 2021.⁹ The Oromo regional special forces were responsible for a significant portion of political violence in Oromia region prior to their dissolution, thus the drop in violence when the force was discontinued.

Second, political leadership in Amhara and Oromia have long been rivals, and with the federal government cracking down on ethno-nationalist Amhara, the perceived ‘national direction’ seemed to be shifting toward a pro-Oromo position. This, coupled with the announcement of peace talks between the OLA/OLF-Shane, could explain a general lack of disorder in Oromia region during the month of April.

Finally, incentives for collaboration also led to a dip in clashes, as the federal government began fighting a Fano insurgency in Amhara region. Between April and November, the OLA/OLF-Shane and the federal government, along with local Oromo ethnic militias, engaged in battles against Amhara ethnic militias (sometimes identified as Fano militia) operating in Oromia region and in the Oromo special zone of Amhara region (for more details on Fano and OLA/OLF-Shane interactions in Oromia region, see the EPO Monthly: December 2022).

The dip in violence was short-lived and reported political violence rose sharply in May. After an unsuccessful conclusion to the first round of peace talks (which concluded on 3 May), the ENDF became more active in Oromia region, resulting in a sharp increase in reported battle events and violence against civilians. Although operations against the OLA/OLF-Shane by the ENDF increased as the year progressed (see the graph below), there is no evidence to suggest that the involvement of the ENDF in lieu of the Oromia regional special forces has resulted in a weaker OLA/OLF-Shane.

Geographical Changes

Prior to the start of the first round of peace negotiations, political violence involving OLA/OLF-Shane was highest in the West Wollega zone, second-highest in West Shewa zone, third-highest in North Shewa zone, and fourth-highest the West Guji zone. After the end of the first round of peace talks, political violence involving OLA/OLF-Shane has been highest in North Shewa zone, second-highest in West Shewa, and third-highest in East Shewa, followed by West Wollega zones (see map below). Political violence has decreased by about 60% in West Wollega zone compared to the pre-peace talk period, while political violence in North Shewa zone increased by about 60%. In East Shewa zone, political violence increased by 50% after the first round of the peace talks, while political violence in West Shewa zone has remained the same.

The warring parties have not explained the reasons behind the geographical shift. However, some factors make battles in areas of North Shewa zone more advantageous than continuing costly conflict in more remote parts of Oromia, like West Wollega or Guji zones. First, North Shewa zone is near the capital, Addis Ababa, and small incidents of insecurity have a bigger impact on the public than clashes in remote areas of Oromia. The North Shewa zone contains the A1 highway, connecting Addis Ababa to Bahir Dar — now a key military transport route for forces employed in fighting the Fano militia insurgency in Amhara region.

As with the shift in actors, there is no evidence to suggest that the change in fighting locations indicates that either warring party has gained an upper hand in the conflict.

Political Shifts

Ethiopia’s political landscape has experienced significant changes over the past six months, most significantly the beginning of the Fano militia insurgency in Amhara region. This conflict has redirected federal resources away from Oromia region, to the OLA/OLF-Shane’s benefit. It has also placed the federal government in a more favorable position in Oromia region. The Oromo public has been exerting pressure to erode the power of Fano militias, which operate in areas of East Wollega and Horo Guduru Wollega zones. Many politicians, along with the local community in Oromia region, viewed the federal government’s alliance with Fano militias during the northern conflict as dangerous, reawakening historical distrust of Ethiopia’s empirical regimes.¹⁰ The federal government’s crackdown on Amhara ethno-nationalists has garnered popularity among ethno-nationalist Oromos, who view the action as evidence that this regime could and would champion the interests of ethnic Oromo. This, interestingly, places the OLA/OLF-Shane in competition with the federal government to be the chief ‘champion’ of Oromo interests. With the end of the northern Ethiopia conflict, Ethiopia’s place in the international community significantly improved, giving the government an increased capacity to carry out initiatives — such as aid for displaced populations, employment projects, and public infrastructure — that could strengthen its base of support among key populations in Oromia region.

On the other hand, the OLA/OLF-Shane has lost a key ally in the Gambela Liberation Front (GLF), which conducted joint attacks with the OLA/OLF-Shane in Gambela city in June 2022 (see EPO Weekly, 4-10 June 2022). In April, the GLF leadership announced its decision to withdraw from armed struggle, committing hundreds of fighters to rehabilitation camps.¹¹

Way Forward

Significant political, geographical, and actor changes have occurred between the first and second rounds of peace talks held between the government and the OLA/OLF-Shane. Despite these changes, the second round of talks concluded just as the first round did: without an agreement. The ENDF’s resources have not translated into a more effective military campaign against the OLA/OLF-Shane in Oromia region, and little progress has been made in resolving a conflict that has dragged on for more than five years.

Both the OLA/OLF-Shane and the government’s willingness to meet again provides some hope that peace negotiations will be attempted again soon, and conflict will ease in Oromia region. Moreover, the lack of military progress by either side could indicate that even incompatible political agendas could be adjusted to allow for more successful peace talks. After five years of war, many in conflict-affected locations have grown weary of the fighting. Yet, considering the government’s poor track record of dealing with armed groups, there is little hope for a lasting solution. Until the government is able to decisively control violence without relying on non-government groups and promote fair and consistent governance, Ethiopia will continue to experience high levels of political violence.