Amhara conflict: Fano insurgency - Ethiopia Peace Observatory

Last updated: 20/08/2024

Beginning in August 2023, conflict returned to Amhara region in the form of a violent anti-government insurgency led by Fano militias. Amhara region was one of the three regions affected by the northern Ethiopia conflict, which began in November 2020 in Tigray region and spread to Amhara region in July 2021. ‘Fano’ refers to a group of armed youth, generally from Amhara region, who are involved in community protection. The term took on new connotations in the later years of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) when it became synonymous with an anti-government youth movement that led to massive nonviolent protests and a limited violent insurgency in Amhara region.

Fano militias fought alongside the Ethiopian federal government and Amhara regional special forces against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) during the northern Ethiopia conflict. Tension between Fano militias and the federal government escalated in April 2023 when a violent conflict between the two actors began in some areas and spread across the region, including the regional capital city, Bahir Dar, in August 2023.

The proximate cause of the Amhara conflict

Before the northern Ethiopia conflict, Fano militias expanded substantially, with popular figures rallying groups of fighters around reports of attacks on ethnic Amhara in Oromia and Benshangul/Gumuz regions, and around the territory claims of Raya and Welkait, Tsegede and Humera in Western and Southern Tigray zones, Tigray. During the northern Ethiopia conflict, Fano militias were allied with the federal government and given weapons and training, taking and controlling western parts of Tigray region together with Amhara regional special forces at the outset of the war.¹ The Fano militias advocate for both a united Ethiopia and the restoration of Amhara governance over traditional Amhara homelands, which include areas of Western and Southern Tigray zones. Local communities support these militias, and its leadership often includes former members of regional or federal armed forces.

The relationship between Fano militias and the government began to sour in 2022, during the northern Ethiopia conflict, as the government attempted to disarm and demobilize the group (for more, see the EPO Weekly: 14-20 May 2022 and EPO Weekly: 9-15 April 2022). Amhara region turned into a hotbed of instability in August 2023, with deadly clashes pitting ethnic Fano militias against the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), resulting in the government declaring a state of emergency. In early 2023, unrest swept the region after the government announced that all regional special forces would be dissolved, triggering a wave of demonstrations and armed clashes between some members of the Amhara regional special forces along with Fano militias and ENDF (for more, see the EPO Weekly: 1-7 April 2023 and the EPO Weekly: 8-14 April 2023). Most of these armed clashes in April 2023 were recorded in North Wello and North Shewa zones. This surge of disorder, however, declined in May and June 2023 as ENDF forces took control of Amhara region and arrested Fano militia members and supporters. In July, violence rose again as Fano militias began to regroup and better organize (see graph below). Violence in the region peaked in August 2023 and has remained at high levels. When the conflict intensified in August 2023, most of the armed clashes were concentrated in West Gojam and South Gondar zones. Later, they expanded across the region.

The root causes of Amhara conflict

There are two main causes of the conflict. The first is discontent linked to political deadlock on the status of the disputed territories in Southern and Western Tigray zones, which are officially under Tigray region but contain ethnic Amhara residents who wish to be governed by Amhara region. The government indicated its interest in holding a referendum in these areas to decide the issue.² However, most Amharas oppose holding a referendum and argue that since the TPLF-led government put these areas under Tigray region without any consultation with inhabitants of the disputed areas in the 1990s, they want the government to make a political decision for these areas to be administered by Amhara region (for more on disputes territories, see the EPO Monthly: February 2024).³

The second issue is the overall state of security for the Amhara people. Throughout Abiy Ahmed’s tenure, ethnic Amhara have been the target of violent attacks throughout the country. In addition, government forces did not consistently defend civilians or infrastructure in Amhara region during the advancement of TPLF forces — also known as the Tigray Defense Forces — in Amhara region during the northern Ethiopia conflict in 2021 and 2022. Amhara nationalists accused the ENDF of withdrawing its forces from towns and cities in Amhara instead of defending positions important to local inhabitants. Amhara civilians faced abuses by TPLF forces during the war, and Amhara settlers continued to be victims of intermittent pogroms in Oromia and Benshangul/Gumuz regions (see graph below). Fano and some Amharas accuse the government of engaging with the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Army in peace talks in a way that removes accountability for the wrongs inflicted on the Amhara people — leaving ethnic Amhara defenseless.

Bar graph - Violence targeting Amhara civilians outside Amhara region - 1 January 2020 - 1 April 2024

The government’s decision to dissolve the country’s regional special forces was viewed in Amhara region as increasing the risk that the Amhara people would continue to be defenseless against the aggression of forces from other regions (for more on anti-government sentiment, see the EPO Monthly: April 2021; for more on anti-government demonstrations after civilian targeting events in Oromia region, see the EPO Monthly: June 2022). Regional special forces — locally known as Liyu Police — were paramilitary forces at the regional level that were tasked with fighting insurgencies in their respective regions. Amhara regional special forces have played a key role in suppressing insurgency attempts within Amhara region, mostly by ethno-nationalist groups seeking greater autonomy.

The ripple effect of the conflict

Following the killing of the head of the Amhara Prosperity Party in April, an estimated 13 political and security officials were targeted in armed attacks across the region (for more, see the EPO Monthly: July 2023). Several local officials were likewise killed in August, according to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission.⁴ There was also a report indicating that the regional police and kebele militias might have aligned with the Fano militias’ cause.⁵ This forced many local and security officials to leave their homes and towns, creating governance and security vacuums in various areas of Amhara region, leading Fano militias to control several locations within the region at the outset of the conflict in August 2023.⁶ This prompted the Amhara regional government to ask the federal government on 3 August 2023 to take all necessary measures, as the insecurity in the region was beyond the control of regional security forces.⁷ The federal government promptly declared a state of emergency on 4 August 2023.⁸

In late August 2023, the regional government was also re-established as a new regional president, and other officials, including heads of various regional security sectors, were appointed by the Amhara regional council.⁹ These officials were tasked with reorganizing the region’s security sectors at each administration level, with the newly appointed regional president confirming that the recently organized regional government would work to identify, and find solutions for, people’s grievances.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Fano militias and Amhara nationalists continue to accuse both the federal and regional governments of being dominated by ethnic Oromos. They do not expect the new regional government to resolve the core questions of the Amhara people.¹¹

The conflict has also affected civilians, including government officials. Government drone strikes have reportedly killed civilians in many locations (see the EPO Weekly: 16-22 September 2023 and the EPO Weekly: 2-8 September 2023).¹² In an interview published in a government-affiliated media outlet, Field Marshal Berhanu Jula — chief of staff of the ENDF — admitted that the ENDF was relying on drone strikes, and vowed to continue targeting gatherings of “extremists.”¹³ Government forces were also accused of carrying out extrajudicial killings of civilians they accused of being members or supporters of Fano militias (for example, see the EPO Weekly Update (20 February 2024)).¹⁴ An unidentified number of people, including journalists and members of the House of Peoples Representatives and Amhara regional and Addis Ababa city councils, were arrested over accusations that they were linked with the militia.¹⁵ Fano militias were also accused of killing officials in the region (see the EPO Weekly Update (5 March 2024) and the EPO Weekly: 23-29 September 2023). Many structures, including schools and health centers, have also been destroyed due to the conflict.¹⁶ As a result, the region has become one of the most unstable in the country.

Fano militias face serious political, geographical, and logistical issues that have impeded their ability to combat the ENDF due to their lack of unity, weak or unclear political stance, and the absence of a clear plan for the future (for more on the hurdles Fano militias face, see the EPO Monthly: December 2023).