Actor Profiles - Ethiopia Peace Observatory

Brief overviews of key actors in the ACLED-EPO dataset.

Click through the drop-down menu below for profiles providing background information on each actor as well as historical and geographical trends. This page will be regularly updated with new information and actors.

Amhara Popular Front (APF) - የአማራ ሕዝባዊ ግንባር

Alias: Amhara People’s Fano Front

The Amhara Popular Front (APF) is an armed, anti-government movement established in 2023 by the former chairperson of the Balderas Party, Eskinder Nega. Like the Fano militias, the APF ascribes to Amhara ethno-nationalist ideals, especially the defense of ethnic Amhara communities against attacks from government and nongovernment groups.¹ The APF first became active in May 2023, when the Ethiopian National Defense Force engaged in a four-day clash with APF militants, who had fortified themselves within the Debre Elias Bihere Betsuan Melka Silase Andent Monastery in Degolma kebele in Debre Elias woreda, East Gojam zone. The government claimed that 200 members of the APF were killed during the operation.

Eskinder has captured the support of many in the diaspora but has struggled to rebrand himself well enough to gain the loyalty of a significant number of Fano militia groups.

In the spring of 2024, the APF was renamed the Amhara People’s Fano Front. Justifying the pivot, Eskinder stated that the ethnic focus in Amhara region was a “byproduct” of the “ongoing state-sponsored leveling, categorization, demonization, mass displacement, mass killing of Amharas.”²

Command Post - ኮማንድ ፖስት

In Ethiopia, the term ‘command post’ refers to a committee of military personnel that controls the security of an area under a declared state of emergency. Under a state of emergency, military forces can search and arrest individuals without a warrant. It also allows them to close streets and order the partial or full suspension of the administrative governance structure or replacement administrators if they identify a security threat.¹

Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) - የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝቦች አብዮታዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ግንባር (ኢሕአዲግ)

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) is a coalition of four political parties: the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM — which was renamed Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) in 2018), the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization (OPDO — which was renamed Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) in 2018), and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The group was established in 1989 as a coalition of ethnic-based opposition movements aimed at overthrowing the Derg regime. In 1989, the TPLF and the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM), which later became the ANDM, agreed to establish the EPRDF. EPDM was founded by former members of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP). In 1990, the TPLF established the OPDO, which consisted of former Oromo soldiers of the Derg regime who were captured by the TPLF.¹ The Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Front (SEPDF — which was renamed the SEPDM in 2002) was established and integrated as one of the political parties of the EPRDF coalition in 1994.² Dominated by TPLF, the EPRDF was the incumbent party from 1991 to December 2019 until it was dissolved and replaced by the Prosperity Party on 1 December 2019.³ The TPLF decided not to join the Prosperity Party, citing differences in political ideology. From 1989 to 2019, the EPRDF had three leaders. From 1989 to August 2012, the EPRDF was led by Meles Zenawi. After Zenawi’s death, Hailemariam Desalegn served as the chairman from September 2012 until his resignation in March 2018.⁴ Abiy Ahmed became the chairman of the EPRDF on 28 March 2018 and led the coalition until its dissolution in December 2019.⁵

Fano Youth Militia - ፋኖ ታጣቂ

Alias: Fano (Amhara ethnic militias)

‘Fano’ refers to a group of armed youth, generally from Amhara region, who are involved in community protection. The term took on new connotations in the later years of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) during anti-government demonstrations between 2014 and 2018 when it became synonymous with an anti-government youth movement that led to massive non-violent protests and a limited violent insurgency in Amhara region. Fano is hailed for being instrumental in bringing about the fall of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front-led EPRDF through non-violent and violent struggles.

The territorial integrity of the Amhara ethnic ‘homeland’ has been a key issue for the Fano movement. Protests led by Fano in 2017 and 2018 were often centered around the issue of Western Tigray zone and the ethnic Amhara who lived there. As the purported ‘protectors’ of Amhara society, Fano has engaged in violent conflicts throughout the state in the name of neutralizing perceived threats to the Amhara people and, by extension, Amhara nationalism.

Prior to the northern Ethiopia conflict, which began in November 2020, Fano militias expanded substantially, with popular figures rallying groups of fighters around reports of attacks on ethnic Amharas in Oromia and Benshangul/Gumuz regions and around the territory claims of Raya and Welkait in Tigray region. During the northern Ethiopia conflict, Fano militias were allied with the federal government and given weapons and training, taking and controlling western parts of Tigray region at the outset of the war. Even before the northern Ethiopia conflict ended in November 2022, the relationship between Fano and the federal government began to sour as the government attempted to disarm and demobilize the group starting in January 2022. Clashes between Fano and forces from the regional and federal government spread in March 2022 and intensified after the Ethiopian government began a crackdown on Amhara ethno-national institutions, including hundreds of arrests in Amhara region and the capital, Addis Ababa, in May 2022.

A government announcement in April 2023 that all regional special forces would be disbanded led to a large number of former Amhara regional special force officers deserting the group and joining the Fano insurgency.¹ Further, some political figures like Eskinder Nega of the Balderas Party also joined the movement, creating additional factions of Fano militias aligned against the government but not necessarily united in political aim. By August 2023, in response to a worsening security crisis, Amhara regional authorities asked the federal government to respond to the unrest, and the Council of Ministers declared a state of emergency in the region. Since that time, federal government forces have been engaged in near-daily clashes with Fano militias in locations across Amhara region.

Fano militias are also active in Oromia region on border areas where a significant number of ethnic Amhara reside. In these areas, Fano (difficult to distinguish from Amhara ethnic militias) often clash with local Oromo kebele militias, government forces, and the Oromo Liberation Army — also known as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane.

Federal Police Forces of Ethiopia (2018-) - የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራል ፖሊስ

The Ethiopian federal police was established in 1995 as a federal government organ with its own legal personality.¹ The establishment proclamation of the Federal Police Commission has been amended several times in 2000, 2003, 2011, and 2016.² In 2018, the Amendment to the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation made the Federal Police Commission accountable to Ethiopia’s prime minister. In 2018, the Ministry of Peace was empowered to supervise the Federal Police Commission.³ However, starting in 2021, the commission began reporting directly to the prime minister of Ethiopia.⁴ Police Commissioner General Demelash Gebremichael heads the commission.⁵ The force is responsible for preventing and investigating crimes against the constitutional order and crimes that fall under the federal government’s jurisdiction. The federal police force also has an obligation to secure borders, airports, railway lines and terminals, mining areas, and federal institutions.⁶ The government deploys the federal police to ‘hotspot’ locations when security incidents overwhelm the regional security forces, usually at the invitation of the regional authorities. In such a situation, upon the invitation of the regional government, the federal police forces are involved in de-escalating the situation and maintaining order.

Kebele Militias - የቀበሌ ሚሊሻዎች/ታጣቂዎች

Kebele militias are organized at the community level and loyal to local government leaders. Apart from some former members of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, kebele militia members have little training and are often armed with older, outdated equipment. Uniforms the militias wear differ based on location but usually consist of a single-colored jumpsuit. Most kebele militia members are volunteers. In some instances, such as during the northern Ethiopia conflict, the government called on kebele militias to join additional units from nearby localities to conduct operations outside their local communities.

Military Forces of Ethiopia (2018-) - የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዴሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መከላከያ ሠራዊት (የኢትዮጵያ መከላከያ ሠራዊት)

Alias: The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF)/The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Defense Force

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) is the national military of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The ENDF consists of four parts: the ground force, the air force, the navy (since January 2020), and the Republican Guard (established in 2018). The Republican Guard is a unit of the military that protects senior government officials. In 2024, it was estimated that the ENDF had around 162,000 active personnel.¹ The ENDF is currently active in Tigray, Benshangul/Gumuz, Oromia, and Amhara regions. The ENDF went through a series of major reforms during the northern Ethiopia conflict, including an increase in recruitment, expansion of drone and airstrike capabilities, and a reshuffling of top officials.²

After the dissolution of regional special forces in April 2023, the ENDF has taken on a bigger role in anti-insurgency operations in Amhara and Oromia regions.

National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) - የአማራ ብሔራዊ ንቅናቄ

The National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) is an Amhara nationalist party founded in June 2018.¹ Belete Molla chairs the party. It is primarily active in the Amhara region, and the supporters of this party are exclusively from the Amhara ethnic group. The stated political goal of NaMA is to champion the defense of the Amhara people inside and outside of the Amhara region. For this reason, continued attacks on Amhara civilians throughout Ethiopia played well into NaMA’s campaign, and the group enjoyed high support in the Amhara region throughout the 2021 electoral period, especially among the youth in urban areas.

In the 2021 House of Peoples’ Representatives election, NaMA won five seats. Two NaMA candidates were shot and killed during the run-up to the electoral period, one in Metema town in Amhara region and the other in Metekel zone in Benshangul/Gumuz region. During their time in parliament, NaMA members have criticized the federal government, taking positions such as voting against removing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front from the list of terrorist organizations in 2023. NaMA representatives fought alongside Fano militias during Ethiopia’s northern conflict but have distanced themselves from the movement since 2023. Many NaMA representatives and members were arrested as part of a general crackdown against Amhara ethno-nationalist politicians in 2022 and during the state of emergency declared in August 2023. Among those arrested was Christian Tadele, a member of NaMA who has held a seat in parliament since 2021. Christian was arrested in August 2023 and later had his immunity revoked in March 2024.

Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) - Jabhadda Wadaniga Xoreynta Ogaadeeniya - የኦጋዴን ብሔራዊ ነፃ አውጪ ግንባር (ኦብነግ)

The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was established in 1984 after President of Somalia Siad Barre’s attempt to unite all ethnic Somalis under a single government failed. The ONLF emerged from a group that split from the Western Somali Liberation Front, which had originally begun an armed struggle to establish an independent ‘greater Somalia’ by reuniting all members of the Somali ethnic group. As a splinter group, the ONLF’s objective was to establish political autonomy for the Somali Ogaden clan of Somali region — although the parameters of secession from, or autonomy within, Ethiopia remain unclear.¹ The group’s major support comes from the Ogaadeeni clan, estimated to comprise 40 to 50% of Somali region’s population.² However, most of those not belonging to the clan do not support the ONLF’s objective, opposing Ogaadeeni clan domination.³

When the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front came to power in 1991, the ONLF ruled Somali region for a few years. Due to a lack of regional autonomy, ONLF leaders wanted to hold a referendum on the region’s self-determination in 1994. However, the federal security forces intervened, arresting ONLF leaders and closing their office; the remaining ONLF members have fought the federal government since 1994. Counter-insurgency efforts conducted by the Ethiopian government from 1994 to 2018 resulted in many civilians being mistreated, displaced, and extrajudicially killed, giving Ogaden region a reputation as one of the most violent in the country at the time.⁴

Like many other anti-government insurgent groups in Ethiopia, the ONLF returned to Ethiopia and Somali region as a political party in 2018 at the invitation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, concluding 24 years of armed struggle.⁵ Under a 2018 joint declaration, the ONLF and the government agreed to halt hostilities against each other and the ONLF was permitted to peacefully pursue its political objectives by respecting the constitution and establishing “a joint committee to further discuss substantive issues pertaining to the root causes of the conflict in the region through continuous engagement inside the country.”⁶ The agreement was signed after six years of negotiations between the two parties.

ONLF leaders returned to Somali region in December 2018 and demobilized their fighters. Meanwhile, the Somali regional state president was meant to implement the joint declaration. Initially, the ONLF party leaders’ efforts to renegotiate the region’s political architecture and secure themselves a more prominent position within the federal government⁷ created tension between the Somali region’s government and the ONLF throughout 2019, and tensions ran high. Nevertheless, in June 2019, the Joint Committee of the Somali Regional Government and the ONLF was established to provide a mechanism for discussing political issues.⁸

In 2019, the ONLF registered as a political party to participate in Ethiopia’s sixth general election. In September 2021, however, it decided to boycott the election, citing the National Election Board of Ethiopia’s failure to address pre-election disputes over voter registration in Somali region.⁹ Four opposition parties in Somali region, including the ONLF, boycotted the 2021 general election, leaving only the Prosperity Party and the West Somali Democratic Party. As of July 2024, the ONLF was actively participating in national dialogue activities.¹⁰

Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) - የኦሮሞ ነጻነት ሠራዊት

Alias: Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane

The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — also known as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane by the government and non-Oromos — was originally the military wing of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) party and split from the OLF in April 2019 due to disagreement over disarming its fighters and non-implementation of the Asmara agreement, a peace deal designed to end hostilities between the OLF and the Ethiopian government.¹ OLA is led by a politico-military body called the OLF-OLA High Command, which was established by the 2021 General Assembly (Kora Sabaa) to direct OLA’s military, political, and diplomatic ambitions.² As of July 2024, the OLA is fighting with the government of Ethiopia, with clashes occurring on a near-daily basis in various parts of Oromia, especially in the western and southern parts of the region. OLA wings across various locations in Oromia say they seek to ensure the right to self-determination of the Oromo peoples, protect human rights, and end the marginalization of ethnic Oromos.³

While the exact number of fighters under the OLA’s command is unknown, ranks exponentially increased throughout 2021, 2022, and 2023 as the group recruited and trained thousands of new forces.⁴

During 2019, the first year of the OLA’s insurgency, its military operation was restricted to West Wollega and Guji zones. However, the group subsequently broadened its operation and began operating in all zones of Oromia region, particularly in North Shewa, West Shewa, Horo Guduru Wollega, East Wollega, and South West Shewa zones. In these areas, the OLA conducts regular attacks on government officials, military forces, kebele communal militia, and police. The group has an urban ‘hit squad’ called Abbaa Torbee, which is often involved in violent operations in cities, including assassinations of government officials.

The OLA has been blamed for a significant number of attacks against ethnic Amharas living in Oromia region. The official spokesperson for the group denied these accusations and insisted that the OLA is not responsible, demanding an independent investigation. OLA also engages violently with Fano militias — another anti-government militia in Amhara region — mostly in border towns of Amhara and Oromia regions such as Dera woreda in North Shewa and Gidda Ayana and Kiremu woredas in East Wollega zone.

In May 2021, the Ethiopian House of People’s Representatives designated the OLA as a terrorist organization.⁵ During the northern Ethiopia conflict (2020-2022), the OLA formed an alliance with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The two groups — TPLF and OLA — engaged federal troops in Amhara region in 2021.⁶

In 2023, the OLA conducted two rounds of unsuccessful peace negotiations with the government of Ethiopia. The first round was conducted in Tanzania from 24 April to 3 May 2023 and concluded with no settlement. Following the unsuccessful first round of negotiation, the OLA accused the government of Ethiopia of intensifying attacks in various parts of Oromia against its forces.⁷ The second round of peace negotiations was conducted in November 2023 and attended by the OLA’s higher military commanders, including OLA commander Kumsa Diriba and his deputy commander Gemechu Aboye. The negotiations again ended without an agreement, and conflict subsequently intensified.

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) - Adda Bilisummaa Oromoo (ABO) - ኦሮሞ ነጽነት ግንባር (ኦነግ)

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was established in 1973. According to the group’s mission statement, the OLF campaigns for the self-determination of the Oromo people.¹ In May 1991, the OLF, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front signed an agreement to establish a transitional government in Ethiopia.² However, because of intimidation and irregularities, the OLF boycotted the regional election in 1992, withdrew from the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, and launched an armed insurrection.³ After Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed invited various armed opposition groups to return to Ethiopia and participate in the democratization process peacefully in April 2018, representatives of the Ethiopian government and the OLF reached a peace agreement in Asmara, Eritrea, and formed a joint committee to supervise the implementation of the agreement.⁴ Following the agreement, in September 2018, OLF leaders returned to Ethiopia.⁵ After a month-long standoff, around 800 to 1,000 OLF fighters disarmed, while the military wing of OLF, which is known as the Oromo Liberation Army, split from the party in April 2019.⁶ The government also arrested several high-ranking OLF leaders and put the chairman of the party, Dawud Ibsa, under house arrest between May 2021 and March 2022.⁷ The OLF did not participate in the sixth general election of Ethiopia due to an internal struggle among its leadership and intimidation by the government.⁸ The OLF’s vice chairman, Ararso Bikila, now leads a splinter faction of the party that is recognized by the National Election Board of Ethiopia.⁹ On 10 April 2024, Bate Urgessa, a senior official in the OLF, was shot and killed by gunmen with suspected links to the Ethiopian government.¹⁰

Prosperity Party (PP) - ብልጽግና ፓርቲ

The Prosperity Party (PP) is the ruling party that replaced the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) on 1 December 2019. It was established by three parties within the EPRDF coalition and five other former sister parties of the EPRDF.¹ The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, a founder of the EPRDF, strongly opposed the Prosperity Party and decided not to join, while the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) dissolved to join the PP.² Other parties that dissolved and merged with PP are the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Benshangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF), the Ethiopian Somali People’s Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Gambella People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), and the Harari National League (HNL). The chairman of PP is Abiy Ahmed. The party’s factions are identified as the Amhara PP (የአማራ ብልጽግና ፓርቲ), the Oromia PP (የኦሮሚያ ብልጽግና ፓርቲ), the Tigray PP (የትግራይ ብልጽግና ፓርቲ), the South Ethiopia PP (የደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ ብልጽግና ፓርቲ), and the Afar PP (የአፋር ብልጽግና ፓርቲ), among others. In 2022, Abiy Ahmed stated that the party had over 11 million members.³

The Amhara Prosperity Party faces considerable opposition in Amhara region from the ongoing Fano insurgency and other Amhara ethno-nationalist political movements. On 27 April 2023, the head of the Amhara Prosperity Party and a number of local officials were shot and killed by unidentified armed attackers as they traveled through North Shewa zone, Amhara region. As political violence has increased in Amhara region, so have targeted attacks against Prosperity Party officials.

Qeerroo - ቄሮ

Qeerroo in Afaan Oromo (the language of ethnic Oromo) refers to a social class of young unmarried men. But, since 2014, it has broadly signified a social movement for political freedom and democracy in Oromia region. Although Qeerroo does not have a formal administrative structure, each Qeerroo network is led by local coordinators. Many Qeerroo refer to Jawar Mohammed, former director of the Oromia Media Network, as their leader. The exact number of adherents to the Qeerroo movement is not known. Each district of the Qeerroo network has 20 members with a leader.¹ This network is responsible for spreading information about upcoming labor strikes to the community. From 2014 to 2018, Qeerroo networks were behind multiple strikes, protests, and riots in various parts of Oromia.

The Qeerroo are currently split into multiple groups and claim allegiance to different members of Ethiopia’s political elite. Furthermore, due to heavy state repression, Qeerroo-sponsored protests have been blocked, and some Qeerroo have chosen to support the efforts of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) instead. Others remain aligned with the government, while some have chosen to disengage from politics entirely.

Regional Special Police Forces (2007-2023) - ልዩ ሃይል

Alias: Liyu Hayil (Special Force)

Regional special police forces — commonly referred to by their Amharic name Liyu Hayil — were a paramilitary force tasked with fighting insurgencies in their respective regions. The Ethiopian constitution allows each regional state the power to “establish and administer a state police force, and to maintain public order and peace within the State.”¹ Regional special forces were trained and equipped, especially for counter-insurgency operations, within their regions.

The first regional special force was established in Somali region in 2007 to fight against the Ogaden National Liberation Front.² Over time, similar special forces were established in other regions, expanding to thousands of members in each region. Like regional state police forces, regional special forces were accountable to their respective regional governments. They were organized like a military, each special force comprising various ranks and units. On 6 April 2023, the Ethiopian federal government announced its plan to disband special forces and integrate them into various other security sectors, including the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), regional state police forces, and the federal police.³ According to ENDF Chief of Staff Field Marshal General Berhanu Jula, as of 15 April 2023, the regional special forces no longer exist.⁴

Due to Ethiopia’s ethnic-based federalism, regional special force units — besides ethnically ‘composite’ units like in the former Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples regional special forces — were ethnically homogeneous, an issue that became problematic as they became involved in clashes along disputed territories and borders, and when dealing with communities of ethnic minorities. Over time, and especially after 2016, regional special forces began to be involved in border conflicts and clashed with each other. For instance, in 2020 and 2021, armed clashes involving Afar and Somali regional special forces were recorded in the contested area at the border of Afar and Somali regions. After Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in April 2018, the training and arming of special forces accelerated, especially in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia regions.⁵ This arms race was connected to a lack of trust in federal forces and the ambition of regional authorities to advance and protect their regions against potential territorial encroachments by neighboring forces. Hence, they became controversial as they have engaged in violence against civilians and in border disputes. According to ACLED data, 18% of all recorded incidents of violence targeting civilians between April 2018 and April 2024 involved regional special forces.

In Amhara region, special forces were closely tied to Amhara ethno-nationalism. The special forces in Amhara region played a critical role in assisting the ENDF’s North Command Post by capturing and maintaining control of the Amhara ethnic homelands of Welkait, Tsegede, Tselemt, and Humera in Western Tigray zone and resisting Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s forces advance into Raya areas in Southern Tigray zone during and after the northern Ethiopia conflict. The special force units worked in close conjunction with Fano militias, and both actors have been accused of serious war crimes against ethnic Tigrayans living in Western Tigray zone.⁶ The government’s announced dissolution of the special forces provoked no reaction in most regions of Ethiopia. However, in Amhara region, the announced dissolution of regional special forces was viewed as a formal attempt to reduce the power of pro-Amhara voices and impose the will of the federal government and sparked large demonstrations and clashes between security forces, members of Amhara regional special forces and Amhara ethnic militia. Many Amhara regional special forces are known to have joined the Fano anti-government insurgency⁷ (for more on the Fano insurgency, see the EPO Monthly: December 2023).

Republican Guard - ሪፐብሊካን ጋርድ

Alias: Ethiopian Republican Guard

The Republican Guard is a specialized elite armed unit established in 2018 by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to protect high-ranking officials and their families from threats and potential attacks.¹ The chief commander of the Republican Guard is accountable to the Office of the Prime Minister for operational activities and to the Ministry of Defense concerning administrative activities.²

Beyond this, the Republican Guard was also actively involved in military operations during the two-year conflict in northern Ethiopia that started in November 2020. It has played a significant role in counter-offensives against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front’s forces — Tigray Defense Forces — in Raya and western Tigray areas, and helped the government take control of Adikeyih, Mekele, Humera, and Dansha towns in Tigray region in December 2020.³

In 2023, the Republican Guard engaged in armed clashes with Fano militias in Amhara region and military operations against the Oromo Liberation Army in Oromia region.⁴

Samri Youth Militia - ሳምሪ

Samri is an informal Tigrayan youth group named after an area in Maikadra inhabited mostly by ethnic Tigray. One Samri group typically consists of 20 to 30 ethnic Tigray youth.¹ It is likely that most members of Samri were absorbed into the Tigray Defense Forces and participated in the northern Ethiopia conflict between November 2020 and November 2022. This youth group is believed to have been actively involved in the November 2020 massacre in Maikadra, where as many as 600 ethnic Amhara were killed in a bout of ethnic violence shortly after the northern Ethiopia conflict began.²

The Interim Regional Administration of Tigray Region - የትግራይ ክልል ጊዜያዊ አስተዳደር

Article 10 of the so-called Pretoria Agreement,¹ which ended the armed conflict between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government, required an inclusive interim regional administration to be established through political dialogue. As such, on 23 March 2023, the federal government appointed TPLF spokesperson Getachew Reda as the head of the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray.² In a statement, the Prime Minister’s Office said Getachew would be tasked with setting up “an inclusive administration that ensures the representation of various political forces operating in the region.”³ About half of the administration’s top officials came from the TPLF, leading to accusations that the TPLF was improperly dominating the interim administration of Tigray region.

Since its inception, the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray has struggled against several issues, including corruption, security issues, and internal divisions. On 7 September 2023, in the Romanat Square area in Mekele town, Tigray, the regional police beat and arrested at least 150 people, including 50 members and leaders of opposition parties who had gathered to hold a peaceful demonstration against Tigray’s interim government. In October 2023, the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray removed six local officials who were serving as the heads of Zonal Public Relations Offices in East, South, Central, Southeast, Northwest, and West Tigray zones. According to the interim regional government, those removed were accused of “violating procedures” after arriving in Mekele to attend a conference called by TPLF.⁴ An additional four high-ranking officials, also members of the TPLF, were dismissed in the following month. Tensions within the administrative structures of Tigray region — specifically between the TPLF leadership and the interim government — will likely continue to play out.

Tigray Defense Forces - ሓይልታት ምክልኻል ትግራይ

Alias: Tigray Militias

The Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) were formed by a number of former Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) generals in Tigray region during the northern Ethiopia Conflict. Following an initial period of conflict with the ENDF in November 2020, the Amhara regional special forces, Amhara ethnic militias, government forces, and allied Eritrean Defense Forces troops successfully gained control of all major cities in Tigray region, including the capital city, Mekele. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fighters and former Tigrayan ENDF generals loyal to the TPLF fled to mountainous areas of the region to regroup. Abuses of the local population by Ethiopian and Eritrean troops in Tigray led to the successful recruitment of many youths, allowing for the formation of a formidable fighting force, the TDF, in the first half of 2021.¹ Alongside youth recruited and trained by the TDF, the force was joined by local kebele militias and former Tigray regional special forces. Due to increasing pressure from the TDF, the ENDF withdrew its forces from the region on 28 June 2021 after announcing a unilateral ceasefire.² In the summer of 2021, TDF began attacking territories within Afar and Amhara regions.

The TDF was eventually pushed back into Tigray region, and the northern conflict ended with the signing of the AU-led Agreement for Lasting Peace through a Permanent Cessation of Hostilities in November 2022. In the peace agreement, the TDF agreed to a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as designed by the federal government. As of February 2024, some 270,000 TDF soldiers remained armed.³

After a long period of inactivity, in February 2024, Tigray militias fought Amhara ethnic militias in disputed territories in Southern Tigray zone, Tigray, forcing the intervention of the ENDF (for more, see the EPO Weekly (20 February 2024) and the EPO Weekly (27 February 2024)).

Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) - ህዝባዊ ወያነ ሓርነት ትግራይ (ህወሓት)

Alias: Weyane

Initially, the group’s objective was to secede and establish an independent Tigray. The TPLF mobilized Tigrayans to join its forces and fight the central government — the Derg regime. In 1989, the TPLF and two other groups that were established by TPLF — the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) and the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) — created a coalition party called the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). After 16 years of civil war, the EPRDF took control of Addis Ababa in 1991 and formed a transitional government that developed a new constitution and implemented ethnic-based federalism.

The TPLF-led EPRDF won the first general election in 1995 and became Ethiopia’s ruling party until it was dissolved and replaced by the Prosperity Party on 1 December 2019. Opposition to the TPLF’s domination of the government was a key trigger for widespread protests in Oromia and Amhara regions throughout 2014-2018, culminating in a change of government and the coming to power of a new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed. In 2019, the TPLF decided not to join the Prosperity Party and continued to govern the Tigray region until the beginning of the northern Ethiopia conflict on 3 November 2020.

During the northern Ethiopia conflict between November 2020 and November 2022, the TPLF fought the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Amhara regional special forces, Fano militias, and the Eritrean Defense Forces in Tigray, Amhara, and Afar regions. In November 2020, it was estimated that the TPLF commanded around 250,000 fighters, referred to as the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF).¹ In January 2021, several members of the TPLF’s top leadership were killed and captured by the ENDF.² In November 2021, the TPLF became one of the members of the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces, a short-lived confederation of nine anti-government insurgent groups aimed at toppling the Abiy Ahmed-led government. Shortly after the northern Ethiopia conflict began, the TPLF was labeled a terrorist organization by the federal government, complicating opportunities for peace talks.

Following two years of conflict, the Ethiopian government and TPLF leaders signed the Agreement for Lasting Peace through Permanent Cessation of Hostility on 2 November 2022, after more than a week of formal peace talks in Pretoria, South Africa.³ In the agreement, the TPLF agreed to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate TDF fighters. The TPLF leadership remained in key positions in the Tigray regional government and formed the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray in March 2023. Getachew Reda, who served as the TPLF’s spokesperson, was appointed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as interim president of Tigray region on 23 March 2023. A week after this appointment, the TPLF was removed from the list of terrorist organizations in Ethiopia, drawing mixed reactions. While the majority of Ethiopia’s parliament members voted for its removal, some opposition parties called the removal an “exemption from accountability.”⁴ Further, in May 2023, the National Election Board of Ethiopia refused to restore the TPLF’s legal registration as a political party, saying it had no legal framework for reinstating a political party that lost its status due to its armed struggle against the government.⁵ However, on 4 June 2024, parliament approved a new amendment to the Electoral, Political Parties Registration and Election’s Code of Conduct Proclamation, allowing former political parties that lost their political party status due to their involvement in armed clashes to re-register as a party.⁶ Following this amendment, on 24 June, the general attorney asked the National Election Board of Ethiopia to re-register the TPLF as a party.⁷

As the leadership of Tigray region, the TPLF and the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray face several serious challenges. Demobilized but not disarmed, TDF soldiers frequently protest in Mekele, demanding better medical treatment and conditions. Tigray region faces food shortages, and thousands of internally displaced persons are unable to return to their homes in disputed territory in Southern and Western Tigray zones. In October 2023, internal tensions between the interim administration and TPLF leaders led to zone-level reshuffles in leadership.